T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
scripts/snapbyte_digest.py:12- Finding
Bearer API Credential Can Be Redirected to an Arbitrary Host
- Content
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str: base = BASE_URL.rstrip("/") if not query: return f"{base}{path}" filtered = {k: v for k, v in query.items() if v is not None} return f"{base}{path}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(filtered)}" def api_request(path: str, query: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> Any: api_key = os.environ.get("SNAPBYTE_API_KEY") if not api_key: print("Missing SNAPBYTE_API_KEY", file=sys.stderr) sys.exit(2) request = urllib.request.Request(build_url(path, query), method="GET") request.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {api_key}") request.add_header("Accept", "application/json") try: with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response: ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill documentation declares `https://api.snapbyte.dev` as the API origin, but the implementation permits the origin to be replaced through the `SNAPBYTE_BASE_URL` environment variable. The code does not validate the resulting URL's scheme, hostname, port, or embedded user information before attaching the bearer credential. Consequently, any process, configuration layer, launcher, or attacker that can influence this environment variable can cause the helper to send `SNAPBYTE_API_KEY` to an unintended server. The override also accepts plaintext HTTP, which can expose the credential through network interception. Sending the bearer token to the genuine Snapbyte endpoint is necessary for the declared functionality. Allowing that token to be sent to arbitrary origins exceeds the minimum privileges required. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker gains the ability to influence the Skill process environment or i ...[truncated 1228 chars]- Remediation
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