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Security audit

Ika Move

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a legitimate Ika/Sui integration guide, but some copyable wallet and key-handling examples could put funds or keys at risk if used as written.

Review and harden the examples before production use: add authorization to every public shared-wallet function, cap presign pool growth, use cryptographically random seed material stored in a secure keystore, avoid raw private-key import unless strictly necessary, document user consent for shared signing, and pin audited dependency versions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:42
Finding

Mutable and Unpinned Cryptographic Dependencies

Content
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Remediation
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" ``` 2. Pin `@ika.xyz/sdk` to an exact reviewed version rather than accepting the registry's current default: ```bash pnpm add --save-exact @ika.xyz/sdk@ ``` 3. Commit `pnpm-lock.yaml` and enforce frozen-lockfile installation in CI: ```bash pnpm install --frozen-lockfile ``` 4. Enable dependency update review and require security testing before changing pinned revisions. 5. Verify package provenance and integrity where supported, and protect CI against untrusted lifecycle scripts. 6. Maintain separate audited pins for testnet and mainnet deployments rather than relying on mutable branches. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
references/patterns.md:407
Finding

Unauthenticated Presign Replenishment Can Drain Shared Wallet Fees

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/typescript-integration.md:27
Finding

Predictable Literal Seeds Used in Cryptographic Key-Derivation Examples

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The imported key wallet pattern walks developers through importing an existing private key into the protocol flow without any strong warning that this involves highly sensitive key material and elevated compromise risk. In this skill's context—guidance for production Ika/Sui integrations—such omission is dangerous because developers may normalize key-import flows without adding strict operational controls, isolation, auditing, or preferring fresh key generation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The key import example accepts an existing privateKey and passes it into SDK processing without an explicit warning about extreme sensitivity, handling expectations, or storage constraints. In this skill context, developers are being guided to integrate cross-chain wallet and signing flows, so under-documenting private key handling increases the chance that consumers log, persist, transmit, or otherwise misuse raw key material, leading to irreversible wallet compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill documents an irreversible operation that converts a zero-trust dWallet into a shared model, but the warning is limited to irreversibility and does not clearly explain the security consequence: the user-held secret share becomes public/contract-controlled, changing the trust model and enabling autonomous signing by the contract. In a smart-contract integration guide, omission of that explicit risk can cause developers to expose user-controlled assets or signing authority without fully understanding the downgrade in key custody guarantees.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The shared dWallet pattern explicitly states that it uses a public user share so the network can sign without user interaction, but the reference does not prominently warn integrators that this removes per-signature user consent. In a contract-integration guide, omitting that warning can mislead developers into deploying a treasury/signing design with materially different trust and authorization properties than a user-approved signing flow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This markdown file describes request_make_dwallet_user_secret_key_shares_public as "Irreversible," but does not include a clear user-facing warning about the consequences for user data/security posture before using the operation. Because the file is documentation for a safety-sensitive action that changes secret key shares to public, it should more explicitly warn users about the impact and caution against accidental use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes executable examples that sign and submit blockchain transactions, which can spend gas and mutate on-chain state. The surrounding documentation does not provide an explicit warning that these calls will execute real transactions or incur costs, so users may copy them without understanding the impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.