T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:30- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Installer Execution
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a straightforward remote image generator, but users should treat prompts and API tokens as data shared with the Neta service.
Before installing, be comfortable with using Neta's remote API: your prompt, optional reference UUID, and token are sent to api.talesofai.com. Prefer a pinned or ClawHub-managed install path, avoid putting real secrets in shell history, and rotate the Neta token if you have already pasted it into commands or logs.
SKILL.md:30Unpinned Third-Party Installer Execution
waifugen.js:11API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments
The README describes sending prompts and optional reference image UUIDs to an external image-generation API but does not clearly warn users that their input data is transmitted to a third-party service. This creates a privacy and data-handling risk, especially if users include sensitive prompts or assume processing is local. Because the skill centers on remote generation, the omission is more significant: external transmission is core behavior and should be disclosed prominently.
The README instructs users to install and run the skill via npx skills without pinning a specific version. That means execution depends on whatever package version is current at install/run time, creating a supply-chain risk if the package is updated maliciously or unexpectedly changed. In this context, users are explicitly encouraged to execute the command, which makes the exposure real rather than theoretical.
The skill invokes a script that calls an external image-generation API and therefore has network capability, but the manifest does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That makes the skill's effective capabilities less transparent to users and reviewers, increasing the risk of unintended outbound requests or abuse if the implementation changes or is swapped.
The install instruction uses npx skills without a pinned version, which allows whatever version is current at execution time to run. This creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised or incompatible upstream package version could execute unexpected code during installation or change behavior without review.
The hardcoded external endpoint confirms that data is sent off-host to a remote API. In this skill context, that is expected for image generation, but from a security perspective it still creates data exfiltration and third-party dependency risk, especially because prompts, reference IDs, and authentication material are all tied to the outbound request.
}
async function createImage() {
const res = await fetch("https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image", {
method: "POST",
headers,
body: JSON.stringify(body),
The hardcoded external endpoint confirms that data is sent off-host to a remote API. In this skill context, that is expected for image generation, but from a security perspective it still creates data exfiltration and third-party dependency risk, especially because prompts, reference IDs, and authentication material are all tied to the outbound request.
}
async function createImage() {
const res = await fetch("https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image", {
method: "POST",
headers,
body: JSON.stringify(body),
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
}
async function pollResult(taskUuid) {
const pollUrl = `https://api.talesofai.com/v1/artifact/task/${taskUuid}`;
const maxAttempts = 90;
for (let i = 0; i < maxAttempts; i++) {
No suspicious patterns detected.