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Security audit

Trading Card Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears intended to generate trading-card images, but it asks users to expose an API token on the command line and uses an unpinned installer path.

Install only if you are comfortable using the Neta service and sending prompts plus your API token to its API. Prefer installing through a trusted, pinned ClawHub path if available, avoid putting real tokens directly in reusable shell commands or shared logs, and rotate the token if it has already appeared in history or transcripts.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
tradingcardgenerator.js:16
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: tradingcardgenerator.js:16-21, tradingcardgenerator.js:29-38, SKILL.md:16-20, SKILL.md:26, README.md:25, README.md:30, README.md:36, README.md:42, README.md:61-67
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive credential exposure through process arguments
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

javascript
function parseArgs(argv) {
  const args = { size: 'portrait', token: null, ref: null, prompt: null };
  const rest = [];
  for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
    const a = argv[i];
    if (a === '--size') args.size = argv[++i];
    else if (a === '--token') args.token = argv[++i];
    else if (a === '--ref') args.ref = argv[++i];
    else rest.push(a);
  }
  if (rest.length > 0) args.prompt = rest.join(' ');
  return args;
}

async function main() {
  const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
  const { size, token: tokenFlag, ref, prompt: promptArg } = parseArgs(argv);

  const TOKEN = tokenFlag;
  if (!TOKEN) {
    console.error('\n✗ Token required. Pass via: --token YOUR_TOKEN');
    console.error('  Get yours at: https://www.neta.art/open/');
    process.exit(1);
  }

The documented invocation reinforces this unsafe credential-passing mechanism:

bash
node tradingcardgenerator.js "your description here" --token YOUR_TOKEN

Technical Analysis

The application requires the Neta API token to be supplied as a command-line argument. Command-line arguments are not an appropriate secret transport mechanism because they may be:

  • Recorded in interactive shell history.
  • Visible to local process-inspection utilities while the process is running.
  • Collected by process-monitoring, diagnostic, audit, or telemetry systems.
  • Retained in terminal logs, scripts, CI job definitions, or command transcripts.

The implementation does not offer a safer alternative such as an environment variable, protected configuration fil ...[truncated 1431 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Add support for a dedicated environment variable, such as NETA_API_TOKEN, and make it the preferred authentication mechanism.
  2. Support reading the token from a permission-restricted configuration file or secret manager when used in automated environments.
  3. For interactive use, accept the token through a hidden prompt that does not echo input or enter shell history.
  4. Deprecate and eventually remove --token. If backward compatibility requires retaining it temporarily, display a warning explaining the exposure risk.
  5. Ensure errors, debug logs, telemetry, and exception reports never include request headers or token values.
  6. Update README.md and SKILL.md so their primary examples use the safer mechanism, for example:
bash
export NETA_API_TOKEN='...'
node tradingcardgenerator.js "your description here"
  1. Recommend immediate token rotation if a token has already been committed to scripts, logs, or shared shell history.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party CLI Is Executed During Installation

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:32-34, README.md:14-18
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned executable dependency and supply-chain exposure
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md documents the following installation command:

bash
npx skills add omactiengartelle/trading-card-generator

README.md provides the same unpinned installation path:

bash
npx skills add omactiengartelle/trading-card-generator

Technical Analysis

The command asks npx to resolve and execute the currently available package named skills. No exact package version or integrity value is specified. Consequently, the code executed by this installation command can change independently of the audited project.

This creates a supply-chain trust boundary: users may believe they are only installing the reviewed trading-card skill, but they first execute a mutable third-party npm package. If the package publisher account, npm registry path, package contents, or a future release is compromised, the resolved CLI can execute attacker-controlled JavaScript with the invoking user's privileges.

The project itself declares no runtime dependencies in package.json; this finding concerns the installation command documented in README.md and SKILL.md, not an embedded malicious dependency.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the publisher account or release process for the npm package resolved by npx skills, or publishes a malicious future version through the trusted package path.
  2. The malicious version becomes the version selected by the unpinned npx command.
  3. A user follows the project's documented installation instructions.
  4. npx downloads and executes the attacker-controlled package.
  5. The malicious CLI runs with the user's operating-system permissions before or while processing the requested skill installation.
  6. It can access or modify any files and credentials available to ...[truncated 650 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the installer CLI to an exact, reviewed version rather than allowing mutable resolution:
bash
npx --yes skills@EXACT_REVIEWED_VERSION add omactiengartelle/trading-card-generator
  1. Record and verify the expected package integrity using a lockfile, trusted package manager workflow, or independently published checksum where supported.
  2. Prefer a trusted, preinstalled CLI over downloading and executing a package during each installation.
  3. Pin the skill itself to a reviewed commit, release, or immutable artifact instead of relying solely on a mutable repository or package identifier.
  4. Document package identity verification, expected publisher information, and artifact provenance.
  5. Advise users not to run the installation command with sudo and to perform installation in a least-privileged or sandboxed environment.
  6. Establish a review and update process so the pinned CLI version is upgraded only after its changes and dependency tree have been examined.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (8)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill declares only tools: Bash and does not restrict tool scope with permissions or allowed-tools, even though the documented workflow clearly depends on outbound network access to the Neta API. Without explicit scoping, an agent may run shell commands with broader-than-necessary capabilities, increasing the risk of unintended network use, token exfiltration, or abuse of the shell environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The activation guidance says to use the skill when someone asks to 'generate or create ai trading card generator images,' which is broad and ambiguous. Overly permissive triggers can cause the agent to invoke the skill in loosely related contexts, unnecessarily exposing user prompts, API tokens, or shell/network actions when a safer or more appropriate path exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The install instruction uses npx skills add omactiengartelle/trading-card-generator without pinning a version or immutable reference. This creates a supply-chain risk: future package changes, account compromise, or a malicious update could cause users to install different code than expected.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script requires an API token via the --token command-line flag, which exposes the credential to local process listings, shell history, and logging systems on many platforms. That is a real credential-handling weakness even though the subsequent transmission is over HTTPS, because the main exposure is local leakage rather than network interception.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tradingcardgenerator.js (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

js
body.inherit_params = { collection_uuid: ref, picture_uuid: ref };
  }

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tradingcardgenerator.js (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

js
body.inherit_params = { collection_uuid: ref, picture_uuid: ref };
  }

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tradingcardgenerator.js (reported line 89)May include surrounding context.

js
body.inherit_params = { collection_uuid: ref, picture_uuid: ref };
  }

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),