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Security audit

Movie Poster Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a purpose-aligned movie poster generator with normal third-party API and token-handling risks, but no hidden persistence, destructive behavior, or artifact-backed deception.

Install only if you are comfortable sending poster prompts, optional reference IDs, and a Neta API token to Neta's api.talesofai.com service. Prefer a pinned or ClawHub-native install method, avoid putting valuable tokens in shared terminal history, and rotate the token if it was used in a recorded or shared shell.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:31
Finding

Unpinned npx Installer Creates a Supply-Chain Execution Risk

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:31-33; the same command also appears in README.md:8-10
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Complete vulnerable code snippet (SKILL.md:31-33):

bash
npx skills add omactiengartelle/movie-poster-generator

Equivalent documented command (README.md:8-10):

bash
npx skills add omactiengartelle/movie-poster-generator

Technical Analysis

The documented installation procedure invokes npx skills without pinning the skills package to a reviewed version or verifying its integrity. If the package is not already installed locally, npx can resolve and download a mutable package from the configured npm registry and execute its command.

Consequently, the code executed during installation is not limited to the project content reviewed in this audit. It may change after review because package resolution depends on the registry state and user configuration at installation time. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary around an unpinned executable dependency.

The command is not proof that the current package is malicious. The vulnerability is that compromise of the resolved package, its publisher, the registry account, or package resolution path could cause arbitrary code to run when a user follows the official installation instructions.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the publisher account or release process for the package resolved as skills, or influences package resolution through a malicious registry configuration.
  2. The attacker publishes a modified package version containing malicious installation or runtime code.
  3. A user follows the documented npx skills add ... command.
  4. npx retrieves the current attacker-controlled version because no reviewed version or integrity value is specified.
  5. The malicious package executes with the operating-system privileges of the user running the ...[truncated 516 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin the installer to a specifically reviewed version, for example by using an exact package version rather than allowing latest-version resolution.
  • Publish and verify package integrity information or signatures before execution.
  • Document the expected npm registry and publisher identity so users can detect unexpected package resolution.
  • Prefer a trusted, already-installed installer instead of allowing npx to download and immediately execute code.
  • Use lockfiles and automated dependency provenance checks where the installation workflow supports them.
  • Periodically review the pinned installer version before updating it.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
moviepostergenerator.js:10
Finding

API Token Is Accepted Through Process Command-Line Arguments

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: moviepostergenerator.js:10-13; insecure usage is documented in SKILL.md:14-17 and README.md:59-64
Vulnerability Type: T09: Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Risk Level: Low

Complete vulnerable code snippet (moviepostergenerator.js:10-13):

javascript
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
  if (args[i] === '--token' && i + 1 < args.length) {
    tokenFlag = args[++i];

Documented invocation (SKILL.md:14-17):

bash
node <script> "your prompt" --token YOUR_TOKEN

Documented token setup (README.md:59-64):

markdown
Pass your token using the `--token` flag:

```bash
node moviepostergenerator.js "your prompt" --token YOUR_TOKEN
text

### Technical Analysis
The API credential is supplied as a command-line argument and extracted from `process.argv`. Command-line arguments can be exposed outside the process through shell history, process inspection utilities, diagnostic snapshots, audit systems, terminal session recording, or wrapper-script logging.

The application does not print the token, and the reviewed code sends it only as the `x-token` header to the documented HTTPS API. Therefore, no hidden remote credential exfiltration was identified. The weakness is the local secret-handling mechanism: the credential exists in the process argument vector and may persist in records created before or during execution.

Exploitation generally requires another local user, monitoring service, or log reader to have access to process metadata or command history. Exposure through process listings is platform- and permission-dependent.

### Attack Path
1. A user follows the documented command and places a real API token after `--token`.
2. The shell may save the complete command in its history, or operating-system and monitoring facilities may capture the process argument vector.
3. A local actor or service with acces
...[truncated 609 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Read the token from a protected environment variable, such as NETA_API_TOKEN, instead of requiring it in the command line.
  • Alternatively, read the token interactively from standard input with terminal echo disabled or retrieve it from an operating-system credential store.
  • If backward compatibility requires --token, deprecate it and display a warning explaining that command-line credentials may be recorded.
  • Update all examples in SKILL.md and README.md to use the secure credential mechanism.
  • Avoid logging request headers, environment variables, or token values in error and diagnostic output.
  • Recommend revocation and rotation if a token has already been entered into a shared terminal, recorded session, or persistent shell history.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (9)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to install and execute a package via npx skills without pinning a specific version. This creates a supply-chain risk: users may fetch and run whatever package version is current at install time, including a compromised or malicious update, and the README context directly encourages execution from the network.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill declares only tools: Bash and does not constrain network-capable behavior with explicit tool scope or permissions, even though the documented usage depends on calling the external Neta API. That creates unnecessary privilege ambiguity: an agent may execute shell commands with broader network reach than the user expects, increasing the chance of data exfiltration, unreviewed external calls, or misuse of the Bash tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger guidance says to use the skill when someone asks to 'generate or create movie poster generator images,' which is vague and potentially over-broad. Ambiguous invocation criteria can cause the agent to activate the skill unexpectedly for loosely related prompts, leading to unintended external API use, token consumption, or disclosure of user prompts to a third party.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The install instruction uses npx skills add omactiengartelle/movie-poster-generator without pinning a specific version or immutable reference. This makes installs non-reproducible and exposes users to supply-chain risk if the package, dependency tree, or fetched skill content changes maliciously or unexpectedly over time.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill tells users to obtain a token from Neta while the implementation sends that token and user prompt to talesofai.com. This is a supply-chain deception issue because users are induced to trust one provider but their credentials and content are transmitted to a different service, defeating informed consent and potentially exposing tokens to an unrelated third party.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · moviepostergenerator.js (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`\u2139 Prompt: "${prompt}"`);

  // Submit the image generation task
  const createRes = await fetch("https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image", {
    method: "POST",
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · moviepostergenerator.js (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`\u2139 Prompt: "${prompt}"`);

  // Submit the image generation task
  const createRes = await fetch("https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image", {
    method: "POST",
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · moviepostergenerator.js (reported line 113)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`\u2139 Prompt: "${prompt}"`);

  // Submit the image generation task
  const createRes = await fetch("https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image", {
    method: "POST",
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The manifest advertises use of the Neta AI image generation API, but the code actually calls talesofai.com for both job creation and polling. In a skill ecosystem, this mismatch is dangerous because reviewers and users may approve the skill under false assumptions while prompts, reference IDs, and bearer-like tokens are exfiltrated to a different external operator.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.