Magazine Cover Generator

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 5:40 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

The skill appears to perform the advertised magazine-cover image generation, but it needs Review because it handles an API token unsafely on the command line and documents an unpinned installer while sending prompts to a third-party API.

Install only if you are comfortable sending prompts and optional reference IDs to api.talesofai.com. Do not put a real API token in a shell command unless you accept the local exposure risk; prefer a safer secret mechanism if you adapt the script, and review or pin the installer source before using the npx command.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: magazinecovergenerator.js:18

Finding

API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content

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0) args.prompt = positional.join(" "); return args; } ``` ```javascript async function main() { const args = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2)); if (args.help) { printHelp(); process.exit(0); } const tokenFlag = args.token; const TOKEN = tokenFlag; if (!TOKEN) { console.error('\n✗ Token required. Pass via: --token YOUR_TOKEN'); console.error(' Get yours at: https://www.neta.art/open/'); process.exit(1); } ``` The documented invocation directly places the secret on the command line: ```bash node magazinecovergenerator.js "your description here" --token YOUR_TOKEN ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill requires users to provide the Neta API token through the `--token` command-line argument. Command-line arguments are not an appropriate secret transport mechanism because they may be: - Stored in shell history files. - Visible to local process-inspection utilities while the process runs. - Captured by endpoint monitoring, audit, telemetry, or diagnostic systems. - Included in copied command output, support records, or terminal session logs. The token is subsequently sent as the `x-token` HTTPS header to the ...[truncated 1443 chars]

Remediation

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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:32

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution Through npx

Content

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Remediation

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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (8)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The README instructs users to send prompts, API tokens, and optionally reference-image identifiers to a third-party image generation service, but it does not clearly warn that user inputs and image-derived data leave the local environment. In a skill that encourages creative prompts and style inheritance, users may unknowingly transmit sensitive text or proprietary visual material to an external provider, creating privacy, compliance, and data-handling risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

The skill declares only tools: Bash and provides commands that depend on external network access to the Neta API, but it does not explicitly scope or disclose that capability through permissions or allowed-tools metadata. This can lead to unexpected outbound requests and weakens least-privilege controls, especially in agent environments that rely on manifest metadata to gate network use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

Line L20 says to use the skill when someone asks to "generate or create ai magazine cover generator images," which does not provide a specific trigger phrase set or clear scope limits. The wording is ambiguous enough that it could match a wide range of ordinary image-generation requests rather than narrowly signaling this specific skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 84% confidence

Finding

The install instruction uses npx skills add omactiengartelle/magazine-cover-generator without pinning a version or immutable reference. This creates supply-chain risk because users may fetch whatever version is current at install time, including a compromised or unexpectedly changed release.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · magazinecovergenerator.js (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

js

body.inherit_params = { collection_uuid: ref, picture_uuid: ref };
  }

  const res = await fetch(`https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image`, {
    method: "POST",
    headers: {
      "x-token": token,

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · magazinecovergenerator.js (reported line 94)May include surrounding context.

js

body.inherit_params = { collection_uuid: ref, picture_uuid: ref };
  }

  const res = await fetch(`https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image`, {
    method: "POST",
    headers: {
      "x-token": token,

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The skill sends user-supplied prompts and an optional reference UUID to a third-party API without any explicit privacy notice, consent step, or data-handling warning. Because prompts and reference identifiers may contain sensitive personal, proprietary, or identifying information, this creates a real data-exposure risk even though the transmission is central to the skill's functionality.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.