other
- Location
scripts/download_transcribe.py:15- Finding
Automatic Disclosure of Extracted Audio to an External Transcription Service
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill does what it claims, but its transcription mode can automatically upload extracted audio to OpenAI when an API key is present without clearly telling the user or requiring a separate opt-in.
Review before installing. Use it only for URLs you are authorized to download, run it in a private output directory, and avoid running the transcription script with OPENAI_API_KEY in the environment unless you intend to send the video's audio to OpenAI and accept any privacy and billing implications.
scripts/download_transcribe.py:15Automatic Disclosure of Extracted Audio to an External Transcription Service
scripts/download_transcribe.py:7Predictable Output Paths Allow Local Symlink-Based File Overwrite
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.
part('file', audio.read_bytes(), audio.name, 'audio/wav')
body.append(f'--{boundary}--\r\n'.encode())
req = urllib.request.Request('https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/transcriptions', data=b''.join(body), headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {key}', 'Content-Type': f'multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}'})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=180) as r:
data = json.loads(r.read().decode())
(out / 'transcript.txt').write_text(data.get('text',''))
result['transcript'] = str(out / 'transcript.txt')
The skill invokes shell scripts and Python with network, filesystem, and likely environment access, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. In an agent system, this increases the chance the skill is auto-invoked with broader capabilities than intended, enabling unreviewed downloads, local file writes, and shell execution against user-supplied URLs.
The description is broad enough to match many common requests to download, save, send, or transcribe social media content, which can cause the agent to trigger this skill in situations where the user did not clearly consent to local downloading or rights-sensitive processing. Overbroad triggers are dangerous because they expand the operational surface for shell/network actions and increase the chance of downloading untrusted or privacy-sensitive content automatically.
The activation guidance 'Use this for social video links' is ambiguous and does not define supported domains, content restrictions, or required consent steps. In context, that ambiguity matters because the skill performs network retrieval and local storage, so an imprecise trigger can lead to misuse on malicious URLs, non-social links, or content involving legal and privacy risk.
The skill tells the agent to download third-party media to local storage and possibly transcribe it, but it does not warn users that this creates local copies and may handle copyrighted, private, or otherwise sensitive material. This omission can undermine informed consent and lead to unsafe handling of personal data or policy-sensitive content, especially when combined with automated download and transcription workflows.
The script invokes yt-dlp to fetch content from a user-supplied URL, which performs a network operation and writes media files into the output directory. There is no confirmation prompt, user-facing print/log message, or inline comment/docstring disclosing that the script will contact a remote service and save files locally.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
args = parser.parse_args()
out = pathlib.Path(args.out); out.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
video_tpl = str(out / 'video.%(ext)s')
subprocess.run(['yt-dlp', '-f', 'bv*+ba/best', '--merge-output-format', 'mp4', '-o', video_tpl, args.url], check=True)
mp4 = next(out.glob('video.*'))
audio = out / 'audio.wav'
subprocess.run(['ffmpeg', '-y', '-i', str(mp4), '-vn', '-ac', '1', '-ar', '16000', str(audio)], check=True)
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
subprocess.run(['yt-dlp', '-f', 'bv*+ba/best', '--merge-output-format', 'mp4', '-o', video_tpl, args.url], check=True)
mp4 = next(out.glob('video.*'))
audio = out / 'audio.wav'
subprocess.run(['ffmpeg', '-y', '-i', str(mp4), '-vn', '-ac', '1', '-ar', '16000', str(audio)], check=True)
result = {'video': str(mp4), 'audio': str(audio)}
key = os.environ.get('OPENAI_API_KEY')
if key:
This code performs external transmission of downloaded audio content to a third-party API. In isolation that can be legitimate, but within this skill the transmission is implicit and coupled to the mere presence of a credential, making it easy for users to trigger off-device data sharing without realizing it.
part('response_format', 'json')
part('file', audio.read_bytes(), audio.name, 'audio/wav')
body.append(f'--{boundary}--\r\n'.encode())
req = urllib.request.Request('https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/transcriptions', data=b''.join(body), headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {key}', 'Content-Type': f'multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}'})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=180) as r:
data = json.loads(r.read().decode())
(out / 'transcript.txt').write_text(data.get('text',''))
If OPENAI_API_KEY is present, the script automatically uploads the extracted audio to an external transcription service without any explicit user notice, consent, or opt-in at runtime. In a social-video downloader context, downloaded media can contain personal, copyrighted, or sensitive voice content, so silent transmission materially increases privacy and compliance risk.