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Security audit

Smart Meme Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill largely matches its meme-generation purpose, but it embeds shared Imgflip login credentials and sends meme captions to a third-party API, so it needs human review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable with meme topics and captions being sent to Imgflip. The publisher should remove and rotate the embedded Imgflip password, require user-provided credentials or a consented hosted account, and document the third-party data transfer clearly before broad use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/generate_meme.py:114
Finding

Hardcoded Imgflip Account Credentials

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/generate_meme.py, lines 114-123
Vulnerability Type: Hardcoded reusable credentials
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

python
import os
username = os.environ.get("IMGFLIP_USER", "davememebot")
password = os.environ.get("IMGFLIP_PASS", "DaveMakes3Memes!")

data = {
    "template_id": template_id,
    "username": username,
    "password": password,
}

Technical Analysis

The script embeds an Imgflip username and plaintext password as fallback values. Unless both environment variables are configured, every installation automatically uses these shared credentials when sending requests to the Imgflip caption API.

Environment-variable support does not mitigate disclosure because the fallback credentials remain visible to anyone who can access the source package or repository. They can be extracted and used outside the Skill without invoking the script.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker obtains or inspects the distributed Skill package.
  2. The attacker opens scripts/generate_meme.py and extracts the fallback username and password.
  3. The attacker submits authenticated requests directly to Imgflip using those credentials.
  4. Requests are attributed to and consume the resources or limits of the shared account.
  5. Continued abuse may result in unwanted content, exhausted service quotas, credential compromise, or suspension of the account.

No local privilege escalation is provided by this issue; exploitation is limited to the access granted by the exposed Imgflip account.

Impact Assessment

An attacker can obtain the same Imgflip account access afforded by the exposed credentials. The practical scope may include generating content under the shared account, consuming its API allowance, disrupting legitimate Skill use, and causing reputational harm or account suspension.

The reviewed code does not establish that these credentials grant access to the local host, other services, elevated ...[truncated 42 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the embedded username and password from the source code.
  2. Rotate or revoke the exposed password immediately, because removing it from a later revision does not invalidate previously distributed copies.
  3. Require credentials to be supplied through environment variables or an appropriate secret-management service.
  4. Fail safely with a clear error if either required value is missing:
python
import os

username = os.environ.get("IMGFLIP_USER")
password = os.environ.get("IMGFLIP_PASS")

if not username or not password:
    raise RuntimeError(
        "IMGFLIP_USER and IMGFLIP_PASS must be configured securely"
    )
  1. Do not commit replacement credentials to source control, documentation, examples, test fixtures, or packaged artifacts.
  2. Prefer per-user credentials rather than a shared account so usage can be isolated, revoked, and audited independently.
  3. Add automated secret scanning to the development and release pipeline to prevent future credential exposure.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (10)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 103, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The code sends credentials obtained from environment variables, or fallback hardcoded credentials, to an external network endpoint via the imgflip API request. Although the destination is fixed rather than attacker-controlled, this is still a real secret-exposure and outbound data-flow issue because authentication material and user-provided captions are transmitted off-system.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/generate_meme.py (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp:
            result = json.loads(resp.read())
            if result.get("success"):
                return result["data"]["url"]

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill claims AI-powered, automatic caption generation, but the markdown says the agent supplies the captions while the script performs template matching and image creation. More importantly, the behavior includes undeclared third-party API calls and credential use, so the mismatch can mislead users and orchestrators about what data leaves the system and what trust boundaries are crossed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Hardcoding a specific username and password in source code is a direct credential-management failure. Anyone with code access can recover and misuse the account, and the credential may be unintentionally redistributed in repositories, logs, or packaged artifacts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill includes credential-handling behavior and ships with working default account credentials unrelated to merely selecting meme templates. Embedding account access in code expands capability beyond the stated purpose and creates unauthorized-use, abuse, and secret leakage risk if the code is reused or exposed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises executable commands that use environment variables and external network access, but it declares no corresponding tool scope or permissions. This creates hidden capability expansion: an agent or reviewer may treat the skill as low-risk while it can exfiltrate user-provided content to a third party and consume stored credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says to use the skill when the user 'wants to create memes, needs reaction images, wants to make jokes visual, or needs viral social media content.' Several of these triggers are broad, everyday intents rather than narrowly scoped invocation conditions, which could cause the skill to activate in contexts beyond explicit meme generation requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to generate meme images via imgflip and return shareable URLs, but it does not warn users that their prompts and captions are sent to an external third-party service. In this context, users may include sensitive, embarrassing, or proprietary text in the meme request, making silent disclosure to a third party a meaningful privacy and compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The docstring says no API key is required for captioning, but the implementation performs authenticated image generation using a username and password. This mismatch can mislead reviewers and users about the skill's real behavior, reducing informed consent and making hidden data disclosure more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script transmits user-provided captions together with account credentials to an external service without a clear warning or consent mechanism. In this skill context, users may assume local meme generation, so sending potentially sensitive prompts externally increases privacy and compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/generate_meme.py (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

python
encoded = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode()
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        "https://api.imgflip.com/caption_image",
        data=encoded,
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "User-Agent": "openclaw-meme/1.0"}
    )

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.