T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
references/olares-settings-integration.md:79- Finding
Integration Account Command Exposes Unredacted Cloud Credentials
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
references/olares-settings-integration.md, lines 79-85
Vulnerability Type: Exposure of plaintext sensitive credentials
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code Snippet
bash ## `accounts get` JSON shape olares-cli settings integration accounts get awss3 my-bucket -o jsontext Returns the `accountFull` shape including the un-redacted `raw_data` field. **The secret-key value WILL appear in the output** — pipe to `jq` and select only the fields you need rather than dumping the whole payload.Technical Analysis
The documented
accounts getoperation returns anaccountFullobject containing an unredactedraw_datafield. The documentation explicitly confirms that the secret key appears in the JSON output.Filtering output through
jqdoes not eliminate the underlying exposure because the complete response must first be delivered to the CLI process and may be captured by agent tool logs, terminal recording, shell redirection, CI logs, monitoring systems, or debugging instrumentation. Any user or process with access to those records could recover the cloud credential.Attack Path
- An attacker obtains access to an authenticated Olares profile or convinces an authorized operator or agent to inspect an integration account.
- The operator runs:
bash olares-cli settings integration accounts get awss3 my-bucket -o json - The service returns the unredacted secret in
raw_data. - The output is displayed or retained in a terminal transcript, agent tool result, CI log, redirected file, or monitoring record.
- The attacker retrieves the exposed access-key secret.
- The attacker authenticates to the configured S3-compatible service using the recovered credentials.
Impact Assessment
The attainable privileges are determined by the cloud policy attached to the exposed access key. Depending on that policy, an attacker co ...[truncated 251 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Redact access-key secrets and other sensitive fields in all ordinary CLI output, including JSON output.
- Return metadata such as account type, endpoint, bucket, and a masked access-key identifier without returning secret material.
- If credential revelation is essential, provide a separate privileged command requiring explicit confirmation, fresh authentication, and secure non-logging output.
- Ensure application and API logs never record
raw_datacredential fields. - Add automated tests confirming that table and JSON output cannot contain secret-key values.
- Rotate credentials that may already have appeared in transcripts or logs and review their cloud audit history.
