React Native Logs

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 11:20 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

This skill is a small, disclosed guide for installing and using a React Native log-reading CLI, with a supply-chain caution around unpinned global installation.

Install only if you trust the rn-logs-cli package source. Prefer pinning a known version or using a project-local install if you want tighter control, and avoid running the install with elevated privileges unless absolutely necessary.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:23

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package Installed Globally

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 23 and 27
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned global dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet

bash

npm install -g rn-logs-cli

bash

bun add -g rn-logs-cli

Technical Analysis

The installation instructions resolve rn-logs-cli from a third-party package registry without specifying an exact reviewed version. The project provides no lockfile, integrity hash, vendored implementation, or package-source verification. Consequently, the package contents installed by these commands can change independently after this Skill has been reviewed.

The global installation flag also exposes the globally available rn-logs executable to replacement by the selected package version. Depending on the package manager and package contents, package lifecycle scripts may execute during installation with the privileges of the invoking user.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current rn-logs-cli package is malicious.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the package maintainer account, registry publication channel, or package itself.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under the existing rn-logs-cli package name.
3. A user follows the Skill instructions and runs one of the unpinned global installation commands.
4. The package manager resolves the attacker-controlled release and installs it globally.
5. Malicious lifecycle scripts may execute during installation, or attacker-controlled behavior may run later when the user invokes rn-logs.
6. The payload operates with the permissions of the account that performed the installation or executed the installed command.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's privileges. Potential consequences include access to files and environment variables available to that user, modification of user-owned resources, compromis ...[truncated 400 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Pin rn-logs-cli to an exact version that has been reviewed, rather than implicitly installing the latest registry release.
• Document the expected package registry, publisher, and upstream source repository.
• Verify package integrity using package-manager-supported integrity metadata or a documented checksum.
• Prefer a project-local installation governed by a committed lockfile instead of modifying the user's global executable environment.
• Disable package lifecycle scripts during installation when they are not required, and document any scripts that must run.
• Periodically review pinned releases and update them through a controlled dependency-review process.
• Avoid recommending elevated privileges for package installation.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.