Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is coherent for Google Veo video generation, but its install guidance asks users to run mutable remote code in a shell before logging in.
Install only if you are comfortable with inference.sh and the CLI provenance. Prefer a manual, version-pinned download with checksum or signature verification, inspect the installer before running it, and run infsh login only after confirming the installed binary is the one you intended to use.
SKILL.md:16Unverified Remote Installation Script Executed Directly by Shell
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh streams a remote script directly into the shell, which is a classic arbitrary code execution pattern. If the server, CDN, TLS termination, domain, or delivered script is ever compromised, users who copy-paste this command may execute attacker-controlled code immediately.
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
infsh app run google/veo-3-1-fast --input '{"prompt": "drone shot over a mountain lake"}'
The trigger list contains broad phrases such as google video generation, google video ai, veo model, and veo video, which can match common user requests beyond this narrow skill. Overly broad activation increases the chance the skill is invoked unexpectedly, exposing users to its shell-enabled workflow and external-install instructions when they did not explicitly request this integration.
The skill recommends npx skills add ... without pinning an exact package version or immutable source. npx resolves and executes the latest published package, so a compromised upstream package, malicious update, or typosquatted dependency could execute arbitrary code on the user's machine at install time.
This invocation of npx skills add ... is unpinned, which means it may fetch and run whatever version is current at execution time. That creates a software supply-chain risk if the package publisher account, package, or transitive dependencies are compromised.
Because this command executes an unversioned package through npx, users are exposed to remote code execution through package substitution or a malicious new release. The surrounding context is a skill installation workflow, making users more likely to copy-paste and run it directly.
An unpinned npx install command introduces a supply-chain execution path outside the user's control. Even though the command is presented as a convenience for related skills, it still instructs users to execute code from the network without fixing the exact artifact.
No suspicious patterns detected.