Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent explainer-video guide, but it directs users to run an unverified internet installer and unpinned install commands that deserve review before use.
Install only if you trust inference.sh and are comfortable reviewing setup commands yourself. Prefer downloading and verifying a pinned CLI release before execution, separate installation from login, and avoid running the unpinned npx related-skill commands unless you can verify the exact package and skill versions.
SKILL.md:14Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Without Prior Verification
SKILL.md:228Related Skills Are Installed Through Unpinned Third-Party References
The guide instructs users to pipe a remote script directly into sh via curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh, which executes network-fetched code without prior inspection. If the server, CDN, DNS, TLS termination, or publishing pipeline is compromised, attackers can achieve immediate arbitrary code execution on the user's system.
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
# Generate a scene for an explainer
infsh app run google/veo-3-1-fast --input '{
The trigger list contains broad phrases like 'video production', 'video script', and 'tutorial video', which are common in normal user conversations and can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly. Over-broad activation increases the chance that users are steered into executing the skill's tool-enabled workflow, including risky shell commands, when they did not explicitly request it.
The skill recommends running npx skills add ... without pinning an exact package version, which can pull whatever version is current at execution time. This creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised publisher account, typosquatted dependency, or newly introduced malicious version could execute arbitrary code on the user's machine.
This unpinned npx skills add ... invocation depends on the latest package state at runtime rather than a reviewed, immutable version. If the package or one of its install-time behaviors changes maliciously, users may execute attacker-controlled code simply by following the guide.
Because npx will fetch and execute package code, leaving the package version unpinned makes the command non-reproducible and vulnerable to upstream compromise. In a skill intended for broad reuse, this increases exposure because many users may copy-paste the command without reviewing what gets executed.
The command references a mutable package name through npx with no version constraint, so future package changes can silently alter what code runs. That is a real supply-chain hazard even if the current package is legitimate, because installation-time scripts and transitive dependencies may execute.
No suspicious patterns detected.