T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:14- Finding
Mutable Remote Installer Is Piped Directly into a Shell
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly coherent for AI-assisted book cover design, but it asks users to run mutable remote installers that can execute code or install unreviewed skills.
Review before installing. The design guidance is normal for this purpose, but avoid copying the curl-to-sh installer or unpinned npx skill-install commands unless you trust the publisher and have an independently verified version, checksum, or signature. Do not submit confidential manuscript details, unpublished artwork, or sensitive personal images to the external AI services without reviewing their data handling terms.
SKILL.md:14Mutable Remote Installer Is Piped Directly into a Shell
SKILL.md:212Unpinned Third-Party Skills Are Installed Through npx
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh fetches remote content and immediately executes it in the shell, which is a classic high-risk pattern. If the remote host, delivery path, DNS, TLS termination, or upstream publishing process is compromised, arbitrary code can run on the user's machine with the user's privileges.
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
# Generate a thriller cover concept
infsh app run falai/flux-dev-lora --input '{
The manifest description advertises triggers such as "book cover" and especially "cover design," which are broad natural-language phrases without constraints or exclusion conditions. In a skill-routing context, this can cause unintended invocation for general design discussions rather than explicit requests for this specific workflow.
The skill requests broad Bash(infsh *) access even though its purpose is mainly design guidance and invoking a specific CLI. Granting shell capability beyond the minimum required increases the blast radius if the skill is misused, modified, or if command inputs become attacker-controlled.
The examples send prompts and, later in the skill, local image files to external AI services without a prominent privacy/data-handling warning. Users may unknowingly transmit sensitive manuscript concepts, proprietary artwork, or personal data to third-party services with different retention and training policies.
The skill recommends npx skills add ... without pinning an exact package version or commit, so execution depends on whatever package state is current at install time. That creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised publisher account, dependency, or future malicious release could cause users to install and run unintended code.
This npx skills add ... invocation is unpinned, which means users may fetch and execute a moving target rather than a reviewed artifact. In a skill file, that is especially risky because users may trust the instruction and run it directly, enabling supply-chain compromise if the referenced package changes.
Referencing npx skills without version pinning exposes users to unreviewed future changes in the package and its dependency chain. Even if the current package is safe, later updates or account compromise could turn this command into arbitrary code execution on the user's system.
No suspicious patterns detected.