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Security audit

openlist

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent OpenList automation skill, but it needs Review because authenticated file/task changes can bypass or weaken the documented confirmation model.

Install only if you understand the Chinese documentation, use a least-privileged OpenList token, keep plan files in a private directory, prefer HTTPS with verified certificates, and treat task cancellation as an immediate state-changing action rather than a previewed operation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/openlist.py:470
Finding

Operation plans are unsigned, mutable, replayable, and do not enforce expiration

Content
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Dict[str, Any]: if not isinstance(plan, dict): raise UserFacingError("Plan file must contain a JSON object.") required = ["plan_id", "request_id", "created_at", "type", "api", "prechecks", "conflicts", "risk", "resolved"] missing = [field for field in required if field not in plan] if missing: raise UserFacingError("Plan file is missing required fields: %s." % ", ".join(missing)) plan_type = plan.get("type") if plan_type not in ALLOWED_PLAN_TYPES: raise UserFacingError("Unsupported plan type: %s." % plan_type) api = plan.get("api") or {} if not isinstance(api, dict) or api.get("base_url") != config.get("base_url"): raise UserFacingError( "Plan base_url does not match the current OPENLIST_BASE_URL.", hints=["Re-run the preview command against the same OpenList instance and use the new plan file."], ) resolved = plan.get("resolved") if not isinstance(resolved, dict): raise UserFacingError("Plan resolved section must be an object.") endpoint = resolved.get("endpoint") if endpoint not in ALLOWED_ENDPOINTS: raise UserFacingError("Plan endpoint is not allowed: %s." % endpoint) if endpoint != PLAN_ENDPOINTS.get(plan_type): raise UserFacingError("Plan endpoint does not match the plan type: %s." % endpoint) findings = scan_for_dangerous_signals(plan) if findings: raise UserFacingError( "Plan validation failed because it contains unsafe fields.", data={"findings": findings}, hints=["Generate a fresh preview plan instead of editing the plan file by hand."], ) prechecks = pla ...[truncated 4769 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/openlist.py:1320
Finding

Task cancellation bypasses the documented preview and confirmation workflow

Content
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All state-changing operations must use two steps: 1. First execute preview-* to generate an OperationPlan. 2. After user confirmation, execute apply against that same plan. ``` ### Technical Analysis Task cancellation changes remote server state but is implemented as an immediate authenticated POST request. It does not generate an operation plan, invoke plan validation, or require an explicit confirmation through `apply`. The implementation passes the cancellation response through `handle_read_only`, even though cancellation is not read-only. This makes its control flow and audit phase inconsistent with its actual effect. The parser permits every type in `TASK_TYPES`, which includes both `move` and `offline_download`. The docume ...[truncated 1132 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/openlist.py:125
Finding

Authentication tokens can be transmitted over plaintext HTTP or without verified TLS

Content
View full analysis
str: if not base_url: raise UserFacingError( "Missing OPENLIST_BASE_URL.", hints=[ "Set OPENLIST_BASE_URL to your OpenList root URL, for example http://localhost:5244.", "You can also place the value in the repository .env or skills/openlist/.env file.", ], ) parsed = urllib_parse.urlsplit(base_url.strip()) if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc: raise UserFacingError( "OPENLIST_BASE_URL must be a valid http or https URL.", hints=["Example: OPENLIST_BASE_URL=http://localhost:5244"], ) path = parsed.path.rstrip("/") return urllib_parse.urlunsplit((parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc, path, "", "")) ``` ```python class OpenListClient(object): def __init__(self, config: Dict[str, Any]) -> None: self.config = config def _ssl_context(self) -> Optional[ssl.SSLContext]: if self.config.get("verify_tls", True): return None return ssl._create_unverified_context() # type: ignore[attr-defined] def request( self, method: str, endpoint: str, *, body: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, params: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, ) -> Dict[str, Any]: url = join_base_url(self.config["base_url"], endpoint, params=params) data = None headers = {"Accept": "application/json"} token = self.config.get("token") if token: headers["Authorization"] = token if body is not None: data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8") headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json" request ...[truncated 2394 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (12)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/openlist.py (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

python
def load_dotenv_values() -> Dict[str, str]:
    env_values = {}
    for env_file in (repo_root() / ".env", skill_root() / ".env"):
        if env_file.exists():
            env_values.update(parse_env_text(env_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")))
    return env_values

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/openlist.py (reported line 121)May include surrounding context.

python
return False
    raise UserFacingError(
        "OPENLIST_VERIFY_TLS must be one of true/false/1/0.",
        hints=["Update OPENLIST_VERIFY_TLS in your environment or .env file."],
    )

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/openlist.py (reported line 131)May include surrounding context.

python
return False
    raise UserFacingError(
        "OPENLIST_VERIFY_TLS must be one of true/false/1/0.",
        hints=["Update OPENLIST_VERIFY_TLS in your environment or .env file."],
    )

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/openlist.py (reported line 146)May include surrounding context.

python
def build_effective_env() -> Dict[str, str]:
    effective = load_dotenv_values()
    for key, value in os.environ.items():
        effective[key] = value
    return effective

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The delete preview includes critical warnings about irreversibility and the need for explicit confirmation, but these safety messages are only in Chinese. Forcing a single language for destructive-operation warnings can prevent users from understanding the risk, making this a stronger policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The entire skill documentation is written in Chinese and does not indicate that users may choose another language or locale. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale constraint is explicitly justified, which is not present here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

md
- `preview-move --src-path <path> --dst-dir <dir> [--conflict-policy fail|auto_rename|skip]`
- `preview-rename --path <path> --new-name <name> [--conflict-policy fail|auto_rename]`
- `preview-delete --path <path>`
- `preview-offline-create --url <url> [--url <url> ...] --dst-dir <dir> [--tool <tool>] [--delete-policy <policy>]`
- `apply --plan-file <file>`
- `task-cancel --task-type offline_download --tid <tid>`

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This Python file includes natural-language guidance that is shown to users during preview and apply flows, but the text is fixed to Chinese. That creates a locale-policy issue because the skill does not provide any user opt-in, fallback, or language selection for these critical messages.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The rename preview path emits notes in Chinese that describe overwrite and conflict behavior. Because these are user-visible instructions affecting file operations, forcing a specific language without opt-in violates the language/locale policy.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

These notes communicate filtering, delete policy defaults, and task follow-up steps, but they are only presented in Chinese. The file does not offer an explicit locale choice or document a justified region-specific limitation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unsafe Defaults

Medium
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/openlist.py (reported line 1269)May include surrounding context.

python
def command_result(args: argparse.Namespace) -> Dict[str, Any]:
    if args.command == "audit-show":
        config = load_config(require_auth=False)
        records = filter_audit_records(
            load_audit_records(config),
            event_id=args.event_id,

Unsafe Defaults

Medium
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/openlist.py (reported line 1269)May include surrounding context.

python
def command_result(args: argparse.Namespace) -> Dict[str, Any]:
    if args.command == "audit-show":
        config = load_config(require_auth=False)
        records = filter_audit_records(
            load_audit_records(config),
            event_id=args.event_id,