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Security audit

render

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This Render deployment skill matches its stated purpose, but it can guide an agent to create or redeploy live cloud resources with a Render API key without consistently requiring explicit final approval.

Install only if you want an agent to help manage Render deployments. Before allowing API, MCP, git push, deploy-hook, or resource-creation actions, confirm the Render workspace, repository, branch, service names, plans, regions, environment variables, expected cost, and rollback path. Treat RENDER_API_KEY as a secret: avoid printing it, committing it, or leaving it in reusable logs or shell history.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill’s activation description is very broad and covers many common deployment, hosting, and app configuration tasks. In an agentic system, this can cause the skill to trigger in situations where the user did not specifically ask for Render operations, increasing the chance of unnecessary repo inspection, YAML modification, git actions, or deployment guidance being applied to unrelated requests.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The document explicitly lists infrastructure-creation operations such as creating web services, databases, cron jobs, and key-value stores, but it gives no warning that these actions can provision paid cloud resources or alter production infrastructure. In an agent skill context, this omission increases the chance that an automated agent or user will trigger real deployments with cost, availability, or configuration consequences without informed consent.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
The file instructs users to set and pass `RENDER_API_KEY` as a Bearer token but does not warn that the key is a sensitive credential that must not be logged, echoed, committed, or exposed in command history and tool output. In an agent-integrated environment, this can lead to accidental credential disclosure or overbroad automated access to the user's Render account.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.