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Security audit

MaybeAI Upload Audit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for Maibei audit automation, but its sharing path can publicly expose more local files than intended and handles live credentials in under-scoped ways.

Review carefully before installing. Use only test or least-privilege MaybeAI credentials, avoid passing live bearer tokens in shell history, and do not use --share from a workspace or folder containing anything sensitive. Treat trycloudflare links as public, unauthenticated URLs and stop the tunnel when finished.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/share_url.py:97
Finding

Public tunnel exposes the entire parent directory of the selected report

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/upload_audit.py:289
Finding

Bearer token is required as a command-line argument

Content
View full analysis
" \ --user-id "" \ --mode full \ --file "/path/to/image.jpg" ``` ```bash # SKILL.md:22-29 python3 scripts/upload_audit.py \ --token "" \ --user-id "" \ --mode full \ --file "/path/to/image.jpg" \ --html \ --share ``` ### Technical Analysis Command-line arguments are not an appropriate primary transport for authentication secrets. Depending on the operating system and execution environment, command arguments may be exposed through: - Shell history files - Process inspection utilities - `/proc` process metadata - Endpoint monitoring and audit systems - CI/CD command logs - Crash reports or diagnostic collectors - Terminal transcripts The script does not print the token itself, and the token is sent only to the declared MaybeAI/OmniMCP endpoints. However, requiring `--token` unnecessarily expands local exposure of a credential that authorizes remote account and workflow operations. The environment-variable pattern in `run_workflow_curl_examples.sh` avoids putting the token directly in that script's command arguments, but it does not mitigate the primary Python interface documented in `SKILL.md`. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documented Quick Start command and supplies a live bearer token using `--token`. 2. The shel ...[truncated 1008 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/html_report.py:114
Finding

Generated HTML embeds unvalidated URLs into clickable links

Content
View full analysis
preview
{escape(item['file_name'])}
{risk_label}
{escape(item['file_type'])} | {escape(item['url'])}
🔗 查看原图 ``` The spreadsheet URL is embedded in the same way: ```python # scripts/html_report.py:220

审核时间:{now}  |  工作表:{escape(sheet_url)}

``` ```python # scripts/html_report.py:245-247
MaybeAI 合规审核报告 · 由 OpenClaw 自动生成 · {now}
📄 查看 MaybeAI 工作表
``` ### Technical Analysis The `escape()` function correctly escapes HTML metacharacters, which prevents values from breaking out of quoted attributes. It does not, however, validate the semantic content of a URL. As a result, attacker-controlled values supplied through `--uploaded-json` or `--sheet-url` can use schemes other than HTTPS, including `javascript:`, `data:`, or other external protocol handlers. When a report viewer clicks such a link, the browser may execute or navigate to attacker-controlled content. Exact handling of active schemes is browser-dependent, but untrusted schemes should never be emitted into a security report. The external links also use `target="_blank"` without `rel="noopener noreferrer"`. On bro ...[truncated 1810 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
View resource ``` ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (19)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly automates publishing the generated audit report through a public trycloudflare URL, but it does not require an explicit user confirmation or warn that the report may contain sensitive audit data, media URLs, spreadsheet links, or compliance findings. Because the skill is designed to process uploaded business media and return shareable links, accidental public exposure is a realistic outcome rather than a purely theoretical risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This script turns a local file or directory into a publicly accessible internet endpoint via trycloudflare and prints the URL, but it provides no user-facing warning, confirmation, access control, or scope restriction. In an agent skill context, that makes accidental exfiltration of sensitive local data much more dangerous because an automation flow could expose files or entire directories without the operator fully realizing they are becoming public.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The document explicitly states that validation was performed with real user tokens and real production workflow executions, and it provides operational details for reproducing those actions. Even though no raw token value is shown, this normalizes unsafe handling of production credentials and data, increasing the chance that operators reuse sensitive tokens in testing, expose them in logs, or run destructive actions against live systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The notes describe workflows that write to and append rows in live spreadsheets without warning that these operations mutate user-controlled data. In a skill context, this can mislead operators into executing state-changing actions on production artifacts, causing unauthorized modification, data corruption, or leakage into shared documents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The notes provide concrete instructions for invoking authenticated workflow execution, including required bearer token and user-id headers, request structure, and workflow identifiers, without documenting a legitimate bounded purpose or safeguards. In practice, this materially lowers the barrier for replaying privileged backend actions and can enable unauthorized automation or abuse if the document is exposed to an agent or user who should not have this operational knowledge.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The document describes authenticated network requests carrying bearer tokens and user identifiers but provides no warnings, handling requirements, or restrictions around credential use. In an agent-skill context, that omission is dangerous because the notes are readily reusable as instructions for transmitting sensitive credentials to backend services.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Including a dedicated token-validation shortcut tells a reader exactly how to test whether captured credentials are usable, which is highly actionable for misuse. Even though the endpoint may be legitimate, documenting it here facilitates credential checking and operationalizes stolen or improperly obtained tokens.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The generated document explicitly sets lang="zh-CN", and the report text throughout the file is fixed in Chinese. This imposes a specific language/locale on all users without any opt-in, selection mechanism, or documented region-specific justification, which matches the policy-violation criteria.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run_workflow_curl_examples.sh (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

sh
fi

# 1) Copy source sheet
curl 'https://play-be.omnimcp.ai/api/v1/workflow/run' \
  -H 'accept: text/event-stream' \
  -H "authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/share_url.py (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

python
def start_http_server(directory, port):
    """Start a simple HTTP server in the background."""
    cmd = [sys.executable, '-m', 'http.server', str(port)]
    proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, cwd=directory, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
    return proc

def start_cloudflared(port):

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/share_url.py (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

python
'--protocol', 'http2',
        '--metrics', 'localhost:20241'
    ]
    proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)
    return proc

def wait_for_url(proc, timeout=30):

Tainted flow: 'upload_url' from requests.post (line 96, network input) → requests.put (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The script trusts an upload URL returned by a remote service and blindly PUTs the local file to that URL. If the upstream service is compromised, misconfigured, or pointed at an attacker-controlled endpoint, sensitive local files selected for upload could be exfiltrated to an unintended destination.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/upload_audit.py (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

python
content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(str(path))[0] or "application/octet-stream"
    with path.open("rb") as fh:
        put = requests.put(
            upload_url,
            data=fh,
            headers={"Content-Type": content_type},

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This code creates a public internet-accessible tunnel to locally served content with no authentication, expiration control, or access restriction implemented by the script. In the context of an audit tool that handles uploaded files and generated reports, that broad exposure can leak sensitive business data or internal analysis results to anyone possessing or discovering the URL.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The function claims to share a local file, but if given a directory it serves the entire directory over HTTP and then exposes it through a public Cloudflare tunnel. This mismatch increases the chance that a caller unintentionally publishes additional local files, including sensitive artifacts adjacent to the intended report.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/upload_audit.py (reported line 243)May include surrounding context.

python
filename_hint = ""

    port = find_free_port()
    server_proc = subprocess.Popen(
        [sys.executable, '-m', 'http.server', str(port)],
        cwd=serve_dir, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL
    )

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/upload_audit.py (reported line 249)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    time.sleep(1.5)

    tunnel_proc = subprocess.Popen(
        ['cloudflared', 'tunnel', '--url', f'http://127.0.0.1:{port}',
         '--no-autoupdate', '--protocol', 'http2'],
        stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

When --share is used, the script publishes the generated HTML report via a public tunnel but does not prominently warn that the report becomes internet-accessible. Users may assume this is a private sharing mechanism and unknowingly disclose report contents, uploaded file metadata, or sheet links.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The script requires --token and --user-id and uses them in authenticated HTTP requests to remote endpoints for upload and workflow execution. Although this is functionally necessary, the CLI provides no user-facing warning or description that these credentials and related file metadata will be sent to external services.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The script prints user-visible progress and success messages only in Chinese (正在分享到公网, 报告已发布). This imposes a specific language on users without opt-in or fallback, which violates the language/locale policy for natural-language content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.