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Security audit

My Liang Tavily Search

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Tavily web-search wrapper with expected third-party API use and no hidden persistence or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending search queries, domain filters, and raw-content options to Tavily using your Tavily API key. Do not use it for secrets, private customer data, or confidential internal research terms unless Tavily is approved for that data.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill requires environment access for an API key and performs outbound network requests, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens sandboxing and informed consent because a host may permit broader capabilities than users expect, making unintended data access or exfiltration harder to govern.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
if (includeDomains.length > 0) body.include_domains = includeDomains;
if (excludeDomains.length > 0) body.exclude_domains = excludeDomains;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
if (includeDomains.length > 0) body.include_domains = includeDomains;
if (excludeDomains.length > 0) body.exclude_domains = excludeDomains;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The skill presents web search functionality without clearly warning that user queries are transmitted to Tavily's external API. Users may unknowingly send sensitive prompts, internal identifiers, or proprietary research terms to a third party, creating a privacy and data-handling risk.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
This code sends the user's query and optional parameters such as included/excluded domains, time range, and raw-content preference to Tavily via an HTTP POST request. Although the network call is central to the script's purpose, the file itself provides no explicit disclosure in usage text or comments that user-supplied search data is sent to a third-party service.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.