T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:13- Finding
Unpinned Remote Node.js Package Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 13–18
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml { "id": "node", "kind": "node", "package": "SystemTemp", "bins": ["temp"], "label": "Install SystemTemp (Node.js)", },Technical Analysis
The installation metadata identifies the registry package
SystemTempwithout specifying an exact version, package integrity hash, or immutable trusted source. Consequently, the code retrieved during installation can change after this skill has been reviewed.The local
package.jsonalso has nobinmapping for the advertisedtempexecutable. This creates an additional provenance mismatch: thetempbinary supplied by the remote package cannot be established from the audited local manifest as the reviewedtemp.jsimplementation.This is a software supply-chain weakness. It does not prove that the current registry package is malicious, but it permits a compromised publisher account, malicious future release, package replacement, or resolution of an unintended package to introduce code outside the audited artifact.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the publisher account or otherwise gains control of the referenced
SystemTempregistry package. - The attacker publishes a malicious release containing a lifecycle script or malicious
tempexecutable. - A user installs the skill using the declared Node.js installation metadata.
- Because no exact version or integrity value is specified, the installer resolves mutable registry content.
- Malicious lifecycle code may run during installation, or the malicious executable may run when the user invokes
temp.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation would execute attacker-controlled code with the privileges of the account performing the installation or invoking the installed CLI. Depending on those privileges and the malicious payload, this could exp ...[truncated 254 chars]
- An attacker compromises the publisher account or otherwise gains control of the referenced
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to a reviewed exact version rather than using the mutable package name alone.
- Record and verify the package integrity hash through an appropriate lockfile or installer integrity field.
- Prefer installation directly from the reviewed local artifact or an immutable, verified source.
- Add an explicit
binmapping to the localpackage.json, for example mappingtemptotemp.js, so the installed executable is traceable to the audited implementation. - Verify package ownership, publisher identity, and repository provenance before distribution.
- Review and restrict package lifecycle scripts; disable them during installation where they are unnecessary.
- Re-audit the exact packaged tarball and compare it with the repository before publishing or installing it.
