ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

octen web search

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This search skill is coherent, but it needs review because its API key could be forwarded on an HTTP redirect despite claiming it only goes to one fixed endpoint.

Review before installing. Use only a scoped Octen API key you can revoke or rotate, and prefer an updated version that disables redirects or revalidates every redirect target before forwarding authentication headers.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/search.py:61
Finding

API key exposure through unvalidated cross-origin HTTP redirects

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 65, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.py (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

python
)

    try:
        with request.urlopen(req) as response:
            return json.loads(response.read().decode('utf-8'))
    except error.HTTPError as e:
        error_text = e.read().decode('utf-8') if e.fp else ''

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill declares access to environment variables and performs network activity, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. This creates a least-privilege and transparency problem: operators and automated policy systems cannot easily restrict or review what the skill is allowed to access, increasing the risk of unintended secret exposure or unauthorized outbound requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

md
# Security: Hardcoded API endpoint whitelist
ALLOWED_API_ENDPOINT = "https://api.octen.ai/search"


def validate_api_endpoint(url):

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.py (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

python
# Security: Hardcoded API endpoint whitelist
ALLOWED_API_ENDPOINT = "https://api.octen.ai/search"


def validate_api_endpoint(url):

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.