Dx Terminal Pro

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 12:26 AM UTC
• Version: 0.1.0

Overview

This skill is coherent for managing a DX Terminal trading vault, but it gives live financial transaction instructions with weak safety checks around the private key and vault address.

Install only if you trust DX Terminal and are comfortable giving this skill access to a wallet private key that can control real funds. Before using any write action, independently verify the vault address and contract, simulate the transaction, inspect the value and parameters, and avoid exposing a raw private key in shell commands where possible.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:31

Finding

Unverified Remote Vault Address Used for Signed Mainnet Financial Transactions

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 31 and 115–160
Vulnerability Type: Untrusted remote address resolution and unsafe private-key handling
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

sh

VAULT_ADDRESS=$(curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?ownerAddress=$(cast wallet address --private-key $DX_TERMINAL_PRIVATE_KEY)" | jq -r .vaultAddress)

The remotely returned address is subsequently used as the destination for signed Base mainnet transactions:

sh

cast send "$VAULT_ADDRESS" "updateSettings((uint256,uint256,uint8,uint8,uint8,uint8,uint8))" "(5000,200,3,3,3,3,3)" --private-key "$DX_TERMINAL_PRIVATE_KEY" --rpc-url "https://mainnet.base.org"

sh

cast send "$VAULT_ADDRESS" "addStrategy(string,uint64,uint8)" "Rotate into strongest relative volume while keeping 20% idle ETH for opportunities." "$(( $(date +%s) + 86400 ))" "2" --private-key "$DX_TERMINAL_PRIVATE_KEY" --rpc-url "https://mainnet.base.org"

sh

cast send "$VAULT_ADDRESS" "disableStrategy(uint256)" "1" --private-key "$DX_TERMINAL_PRIVATE_KEY" --rpc-url "https://mainnet.base.org"

sh

cast send "$VAULT_ADDRESS" "depositETH()" --value 0.05ether --private-key "$DX_TERMINAL_PRIVATE_KEY" --rpc-url "https://mainnet.base.org"

sh

cast send "$VAULT_ADDRESS" "withdrawETH(uint256)" "50000000000000000" --private-key "$DX_TERMINAL_PRIVATE_KEY" --rpc-url "https://mainnet.base.org"

Technical Analysis

The destination stored in VAULT_ADDRESS is obtained directly from api.terminal.markets and then trusted for every state-changing transaction. The documented workflow does not:

• Validate that the response is a syntactically valid Ethereum address.
• Independently derive the expected vault address.
• Verify the address through an authenticated on-chain registry.
• Confirm that the returned contract is owned by or associated with the expected wallet.
• Check the deployed contract bytecode or implementation.
• Confirm the Base chain ID ...[truncated 2543 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Verify the vault through an authoritative on-chain source

   • Resolve the vault using a documented registry or factory contract on Base.
   • Confirm that the registry associates the vault with the address derived from the user’s wallet.
   • If deterministic deployment is used, independently calculate the expected vault address.

2. Validate the remote API response

   • Reject empty, null, malformed, zero, or non-checksummed addresses.
   • Treat the API result as an untrusted hint rather than the source of authority.
   • Fail closed when the API and on-chain registry disagree.

3. Verify the target contract

   • Confirm the Base chain ID before signing.
   • Require deployed bytecode at the destination.
   • Compare the runtime bytecode or implementation against an approved contract version.
   • Verify proxy implementations and upgrade administrators where proxy contracts are used.

4. Add transaction safety controls

   • Simulate each transaction before broadcasting it.
   • Display the chain, destination, decoded function, parameters, ETH value, gas estimate, and simulation result.
   • Require explicit user confirmation for settings changes, strategy changes, deposits, and withdrawals.
   • Apply configurable transaction-value and slippage limits.

5. Use a secure signer

   • Do not pass raw private keys through command-line arguments.
   • Use a hardware wallet, encrypted keystore, operating-system keychain, or isolated signing service.
   • Ensure the signer presents transaction details for approval.
   • Disable shell tracing and avoid recording commands containing secrets.

6. Improve failure handling

   • Use strict shell behavior and make curl fail on HTTP errors.
   • Validate JSON parsing before assigning VAULT_ADDRESS.
   • Abort transaction execution whenever address verification, contract verification, or simulation fails.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (13)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

This command derives the wallet address from the sensitive private key and transmits the resulting owner address to an external API. Although the private key itself is not directly sent, the skill creates a linkage between a locally held secret and a third-party service, exposing account metadata and trading identity to an external domain.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

md

## Get Vault Address

`VAULT_ADDRESS=$(curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?ownerAddress=$(cast wallet address --private-key $DX_TERMINAL_PRIVATE_KEY)" | jq -r .vaultAddress)`

## API Reads

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 90)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 114)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 120)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Vault Settings

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/vault?vaultAddress=$VAULT_ADDRESS"`

Vault settings include:

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

This endpoint retrieves inference logs containing the trading agent's reasoning and sends the vault identifier to an external service. In context, these logs may reveal sensitive strategy rationale, behavioral patterns, and potentially proprietary prompts or decision signals, making the transmission more sensitive than ordinary public market-data lookups.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

md

### Get Inference Logs

`curl -s "https://api.terminal.markets/api/v1/logs/$VAULT_ADDRESS?limit=50&order=desc"`

Gets the reasoning returned by the trading agent's inference.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill includes live on-chain commands for deposits, withdrawals, and strategy/settings updates that can directly move funds or materially alter automated trading behavior, but it does not present strong warnings, confirmation requirements, or safety guidance around irreversible financial loss. In the context of a trading-agent skill controlled by a private key, this omission increases the chance that a user or downstream agent executes high-risk mainnet transactions without understanding the consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.