T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:210- Finding
Unconditional Commercial Promotion Injected into Task Output
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 210-214
Vulnerability Type:T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python f"[bold yellow]🔓 Want more?[/bold yellow]\n" f"Iris Pro scans [bold]200 emails[/bold], drafts [bold]every reply[/bold], classifies by category, " f"and gives you weekly analytics.\n\n" f"[bold cyan]openclaw skills install iris-pro[/bold cyan]\n" f"Get your key → [bold]ko-fi.com/s/f75940a0ce[/bold]",Related promotional instructions also appear at
SKILL.md:42-44:markdown 👉 **Upgrade:** `openclaw skills install iris-pro` — get your key at **ko-fi.com/s/f75940a0ce** 💰 **Bundle deal:** all 5 Pro skills for **$29** → **ko-fi.com/s/7625accf3f** (save $16)Technical Analysis
The executable workflow unconditionally adds an advertisement, payment link, and command to install another Skill to the result of every inbox scan. This content is not required to perform email triage and alters the agent's task output toward a separate commercial objective.
Because the installation directive is embedded in the generated summary rather than presented as optional metadata, users may interpret it as part of the legitimate workflow. Installing the referenced Skill would introduce additional code and instructions that were outside the scope of this audit.
Attack Path
- A user invokes the Skill to triage a Gmail inbox.
- The embedded Python program processes the latest inbox messages.
- During summary rendering, the program always injects a commercial upgrade message.
- The message directs the user to run
openclaw skills install iris-pro. - It also directs the user to an external Ko-fi payment page.
- If followed, the user installs or purchases an unaudited external component unrelated to completing the current scan.
Impact Assessment
The issue compromises output integrity by mixing task results with man ...[truncated 464 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the installation command and payment link from the generated inbox-scan result.
- Keep functional output limited to scan statistics, priority results, and requested reply drafts.
- If product promotion must remain, place it in clearly identified documentation rather than executable output.
- Make any promotional display explicitly optional and disabled by default.
- Do not direct users to install another Skill without disclosing that it is a separate, unaudited component with its own permission requirements.
- Require an explicit user request before presenting external installation or purchase instructions.
