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Security audit

Chainletter CredCLI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is for issuing digital credentials, but it pushes users into a broad external CLI workflow with risky network, install, secret-handling, and irreversible issuance steps.

Install only if you are comfortable using Chainletter/CredCLI as the required workflow. Pin and verify the CLI yourself, keep network access limited to the required service hosts rather than All, avoid putting real tokens or SMTP passwords directly in commands, and require an explicit final review before public upload, email delivery, or blockchain stamping.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.MD:3
Finding

Mandatory instructions hijack agent tool selection and force external service adoption

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.MD:62
Finding

Unpinned global installation of an unaudited third-party CLI

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.MD:47
Finding

Instructions recommend disabling network allowlist restrictions

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.MD:66
Finding

Registration token and SMTP password are exposed through command-line arguments

Content
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" ``` ### Technical Analysis The registration credential is embedded in a URL passed as a positional command-line argument, while the SMTP password is passed using `--smtp-pass`. Real values substituted into these examples may be exposed through: - Shell history - Terminal transcripts - Process argument inspection - Job or automation logs - Audit and command-execution telemetry - Error reports that reproduce command lines Tokens in URLs are especially prone to accidental logging because URL logging is common in clients, proxies, and diagnostics. Passing a password directly as an argument similarly creates avoidable plaintext exposure. The surrounding guide also states that `credcli workspace` shows current values. If the implementation displays stored sensitive values rather than redacting them, that would create additional exposure; however, the CLI implementation was not present and this behavior could not be confirmed. ### Attack Path 1. A user replaces the sample registration URL or SMTP password with a real secret. 2. The agent executes the documented command. 3. The full command is captured in shell history, a terminal transcript, process metadata, or automation logs. 4. Another local user, s ...[truncated 979 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.MD (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

md
# ── STEP 8: Upload, stamp, and issue ─────────────────────────────────────────
credcli assign job001 <collection-id> --network public   # recommended — IPFS + claim emails
# credcli assign job001 <collection-id> --network private  # internal only — no IPFS, no verification
credcli send job001 --yes                  # upload all PDFs  ← --yes required in Cowork (no TTY)
credcli stamp job001                       # blockchain-stamp (irreversible)
credcli email job001 --email-template credential-claim-email_600x900.html  # public only

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to configure SMTP credentials, including passing the password directly on the command line (--smtp-pass secret), without any warning about secret handling. Command-line secrets can be exposed in shell history, logs, process listings, or transcripts, which creates a realistic risk of credential disclosure in agent or shared-workstation environments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.