T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
cc_animator.py:21- Finding
Predictable Shared Temporary Directory Enables File Overwrite and Deletion
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This video-production skill mostly does what it says, but it under-discloses external voice-generation data sharing and has local file-handling risks users should review first.
Install only if you are comfortable with narration text being sent to Edge TTS for voice generation, and avoid putting secrets or private drafts in scripts. Use an authorized Kling AI account rather than relying on the published email, and prefer fixing the shared /tmp frame directory before running this on a multi-user system.
cc_animator.py:21Predictable Shared Temporary Directory Enables File Overwrite and Deletion
scripts/produce_animated.py:298Undisclosed External Transmission of Complete Narration Text Through Edge TTS
The skill claims 'no API' and broad support for Manim/Kling/upload, yet the apparent implementation uses different tooling and external service dependencies such as Edge TTS. Misrepresenting external dependencies and capabilities is security-relevant because it can conceal network use, third-party data exposure, or additional trust boundaries from reviewers.
The skill claims 'no API' and broad support for Manim/Kling/upload, yet the apparent implementation uses different tooling and external service dependencies such as Edge TTS. Misrepresenting external dependencies and capabilities is security-relevant because it can conceal network use, third-party data exposure, or additional trust boundaries from reviewers.
The skill claims 'no API' and broad support for Manim/Kling/upload, yet the apparent implementation uses different tooling and external service dependencies such as Edge TTS. Misrepresenting external dependencies and capabilities is security-relevant because it can conceal network use, third-party data exposure, or additional trust boundaries from reviewers.
The skill claims 'no API' and broad support for Manim/Kling/upload, yet the apparent implementation uses different tooling and external service dependencies such as Edge TTS. Misrepresenting external dependencies and capabilities is security-relevant because it can conceal network use, third-party data exposure, or additional trust boundaries from reviewers.
Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.
def render_video(name="cc-illustrated-09", fps=30):
print("\n🎞 Renderer video...")
output = OUTPUT / f"{name}.mp4"
result = subprocess.run([
"ffmpeg", "-y", "-framerate", str(fps),
"-i", str(FRAMES / "frame_%05d.png"),
"-c:v", "libx264", "-pix_fmt", "yuv420p",
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
---
name: "cc-video-creation"
description: "CC can create professional FactSage videos itself — free, no API, without asking Jarvis. Pipeline: story → animation (Manim/Ken Burns/Kling AI) → upload."
metadata: {"clawbot":{"requires":{"python3":true},"permissions":{"exec":["python3"],"files":["projects/factsage/"],"notes":"Local video production (Manim/Ken Burns). Kling AI is a web UI (manual). No API keys, no paid calls."}}}
---
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
---
name: "cc-video-creation"
description: "CC can create professional FactSage videos itself — free, no API, without asking Jarvis. Pipeline: story → animation (Manim/Ken Burns/Kling AI) → upload."
metadata: {"clawbot":{"requires":{"python3":true},"permissions":{"exec":["python3"],"files":["projects/factsage/"],"notes":"Local video production (Manim/Ken Burns). Kling AI is a web UI (manual). No API keys, no paid calls."}}}
---
The documentation exposes a specific third-party account email and instructs users to log into that account without any credential-handling safeguards. This can encourage account sharing, accidental unauthorized access, phishing risk, and leakage of organization-linked identity information.
The prompt examples and surrounding instructions are written as fixed English-language generation inputs with no indication that the user may choose another language or locale. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy concern unless the constraint is documented and justified.
The module docstring and command guidance are written entirely in Danish, and the script continues this with Danish user-facing status messages throughout the file. This creates a language-policy issue because the skill imposes a specific locale on users without opt-in, fallback, or a documented regional requirement.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
"-vf", "format=yuv420p",
str(video_path)
]
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
if result.returncode != 0:
print(f" ❌ ffmpeg fejl: {result.stderr[-200:]}")
The header text explicitly emphasizes no external tooling/API and documents commands like '--scene' and '--video'. In reality, the code shells out to ffmpeg via subprocess and the main block does not parse or honor those documented flags, so the documentation actively misstates how the script operates.
The module docstring and user-facing CLI/status text are written in Danish, which imposes a specific language on users without opt-in or an alternative. This is a natural-language locale constraint visible in instructions and runtime output rather than a region-specific requirement that is explicitly justified.
The manifest describes a pipeline ending in upload and mentions broader animation options, but this file only generates PNG frames and invokes ffmpeg to assemble a local MP4. There is no code here for uploading or remote publication, so the implemented behavior is materially narrower than the stated skill description.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def render_video(name="cc-illustrated-09", fps=30):
print("\n🎞 Renderer video...")
output = OUTPUT / f"{name}.mp4"
result = subprocess.run([
"ffmpeg", "-y", "-framerate", str(fps),
"-i", str(FRAMES / "frame_%05d.png"),
"-c:v", "libx264", "-pix_fmt", "yuv420p",
The user-facing comments and prompts are written exclusively in Danish, including usage instructions and operational prompts. This imposes a specific language on users without opt-in or an alternative, which matches the language/locale policy violation criteria.
The module docstring explicitly states that professional animation is added 'uden AI modeller' and lists local requirements as PIL, numpy, ffmpeg. Later, the implementation imports edge_tts and generates voiceover audio, which directly contradicts the documented claim that the workflow does not use AI-model-based functionality.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
'-pix_fmt', 'yuv420p',
output_path
]
subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, check=True)
else:
# Brug PIL til at generere ÉN frame som baggrund
# og brug ffmpeg zoompan til at animere den
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
'-pix_fmt', 'yuv420p',
output_path
]
subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, check=True)
else:
# Brug PIL til at generere ÉN frame som baggrund
# og brug ffmpeg zoompan til at animere den
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
'-pix_fmt', 'yuv420p',
output_path
]
subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, check=True)
else:
# Brug PIL til at generere ÉN frame som baggrund
# og brug ffmpeg zoompan til at animere den
The manifest says the skill can create videos 'free, no API' and the module docstring emphasizes animation 'uden AI modeller' (without AI models). In practice, the code imports edge_tts and uses Communicate.save() to synthesize audio, which is an AI-driven text-to-speech capability and not part of the stated story→animation→upload pipeline.
The function signature defaults text-to-speech generation to "en-US-JennyNeural", which imposes a specific language and locale choice in the skill's behavior. The file does not provide a user opt-in, alternative locale selection path, or justification for why US English is required.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
asyncio.run(generate_audio(vo_text, audio_path, voice))
# Get audio duration
result = subprocess.run(
['ffprobe', '-v', 'error', '-show_entries', 'format=duration',
'-of', 'default=noprint_wrappers=1:nokey=1', audio_path],
capture_output=True, text=True
The concat demuxer is invoked with -safe 0, and the concat manifest is written using file paths that may contain special characters such as single quotes. While this is not shell injection, disabling ffmpeg's safety checks can allow unintended path handling or inclusion of attacker-influenced files if segment paths or working directories become untrusted, increasing the attack surface around local file access and parser behavior.
for seg in segment_files:
f.write(f"file '{seg}'\n")
subprocess.run([
'ffmpeg', '-y', '-f', 'concat', '-safe', '0',
'-i', concat_file, '-c', 'copy', concat_video
], capture_output=True, check=True)