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Security audit

postemi

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

Postemi’s publishing workflow is coherent, with sensitive actions disclosed and optional billing and add-ons kept under user control.

Grant access only to intended workspaces and channels, and review content and targets before publishing or deleting posts. Selected media is uploaded to Postemi. Optional add-ons can affect multiple local agents; select a specific agent when desired. Subscription payments remain your responsibility.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (6)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied commands manage agent skills rather than schedule or publish social posts. Installing and removing skills across local agents is an undeclared capability that changes agent environments, not merely a supporting implementation detail of social publishing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The supplied commands retrieve analytics rather than schedule or publish posts. Analytics retrieval is a distinct user-facing capability not disclosed in the declared description, rather than an implementation detail of scheduling or publishing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Billing and subscription management are distinct user-facing capabilities not disclosed by the scheduling and publishing description. Initiating a paid subscription checkout is more than a supporting implementation detail. The chunk does not demonstrate social posting behavior or a completed payment; it documents billing operations and their expected outputs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The supplied workflow focuses on analytics retrieval and repairing missing content associations, rather than scheduling or publishing posts. Analytics is a distinct user-facing capability not disclosed in the description, and the association repair supports that undeclared capability. No unrelated resource access or malicious behavior is evident.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1015)May include surrounding context.

md
Postemi can generate video, and do not call those routes: they 404.
- **No image or video generation of any kind.** Media comes from files the
  user already has, via `postemi upload`.
- **No channel deletion.** `DELETE /integrations/:id` was deliberately removed
  from the public API. Disconnecting a channel is a signed-in, admin action in
  the web app.
- **Nothing outside the channel table at the top of this file.**

The skill includes installation and removal of agent skills, including installation into every detected agent, beyond its stated social-post scheduling and publishing purpose.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The commands at L1033–L1036 manage locally installed agent skills; L1034 explicitly targets every detected agent, including Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Grok Build. Modifying other agents' skill installations is not necessary to schedule or publish social posts and is not declared in the manifest description. The user-consent requirement at L1039–L1043 reduces unintended execution but does not resolve this capability mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.