T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
pi_claw.py:20- Finding
Automatic Download and Execution of an Unverified Native Binary
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill should be reviewed carefully because it automatically downloads and runs an unverified external executable when invoked.
Install only if you trust the publisher and the GitHub release binary as much as local code execution on your machine. Prefer a version that vendors auditable source or verifies a pinned checksum/signature, uses subprocess argument arrays instead of os.system, and asks before downloading, changing environment variables, or running builds.
pi_claw.py:20Automatic Download and Execution of an Unverified Native Binary
pi_claw.py:47Shell Command Injection Through Unquoted Command-Line Arguments
The declared purpose is Android SDK setup and project building, but the behavior indicates downloading and executing an external binary wrapper without clear evidence of the promised functionality. This mismatch is dangerous because it can conceal arbitrary code execution behind a benign-looking description, making users more likely to approve risky actions they do not understand.
The skill claims to manage Android SDKs, but the implementation downloads and runs an unrelated binary named 'pi' from a GitHub release. This mismatch between declared purpose and actual behavior is a strong supply-chain and trust violation because users may invoke the skill expecting SDK setup while unknowingly executing unrelated code.
The file downloads an external executable and immediately later executes it, which grants arbitrary code execution to whatever content is hosted at the release URL. That capability is not justified by the stated skill purpose, making the behavior especially suspicious and dangerous in an agent context where users may not expect binary execution.
The code builds a shell command by joining the downloaded binary path with user-controlled command-line arguments and passes it to os.system(). This enables shell metacharacter injection and executes through the shell, compounding the risk because the target executable is itself downloaded at runtime from the internet.
# Execute pi command
try:
result = os.system(' '.join(args))
sys.exit(result)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error executing pi: {e}")
The skill advertises behavior that inherently requires network access and shell execution, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. This is dangerous because users and reviewers cannot easily tell what external actions the skill may perform, reducing transparency and increasing the chance of unexpected downloads or command execution.
The invocation description is broad enough to trigger on many ordinary project or build-related requests, increasing the chance that the skill is invoked in contexts where users did not specifically request downloads, environment changes, or builds. Because the skill can modify the system and run external code, over-broad activation materially raises the risk of unintended execution.
The skill describes downloading software, configuring environment variables, and creating shortcut commands, but does not prominently warn users that it will make system-level changes. This is dangerous because users may invoke it expecting informational help, while it can alter their development environment in persistent ways.
The code silently downloads an executable into the skill directory with only a generic status message and no explicit consent, warning, or integrity verification. This increases the chance of unnoticed installation of untrusted code and reduces the user's opportunity to make an informed trust decision.
The skill executes the binary without a specific warning that a subprocess or external program will be launched. In this context, that is dangerous because the binary was obtained dynamically and users of an Android SDK management skill would not reasonably expect unrelated executable code to run.
The build functionality is presented without warning that building a project may execute project-defined scripts, toolchains, or plugins and may modify build artifacts. In the context of untrusted repositories, invoking a build can trigger arbitrary commands embedded in the project's build configuration.