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Security audit

图像生成 / Image Generation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s image-generation purpose is coherent, but it tells the agent to send a Coze API key and prompts to a configurable endpoint and to download returned URLs without validation.

Install only if you trust the Coze configuration source and understand that your prompts and Coze API token will be used for external API calls. Pin the endpoint to an official HTTPS Coze domain, protect the credential config file, and validate downloaded image URLs before use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:66
Finding

Bearer Credential Forwarded to an Unvalidated Configurable Endpoint

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:88
Finding

Unvalidated Workflow URL Download Permits Unintended Network Requests and Unbounded File Writes

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation explicitly instructs reading an API key from local config and sending both the user prompt and credentials to an external Coze endpoint, but it does not provide a clear user-facing warning about third-party data transmission. This creates a real privacy and trust issue because users may unknowingly send sensitive prompts or metadata to an external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The documented workflow performs a direct outbound HTTP request to an external API using a bearer token and user-supplied prompt content. In context, this is expected functionality for an image generation integration, but it is still a real security/privacy concern because unredacted user input is transmitted off-host and the skill does not emphasize consent, destination validation, or safe handling of returned URLs.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

md
PROMPT="一只可爱的橘猫在窗台上晒太阳,温暖的光线,写实摄影风格 --ar 1:1"

# 3. 调用 coze_workflow 执行 / Execute
result=$(curl -s -X POST "${BASE_URL}/v1/workflow/stream_run" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The placeholder value is written only in Chinese ("你的扣子工作流id"), which imposes a specific language in the configuration without offering a language choice or documenting why a Chinese locale is required. This matches the language/locale policy concern for natural-language content in config files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.