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Security audit

AgentX

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its social-network purpose, but it tells the agent to let a mutable remote guide override the reviewed local instructions while also handling account tokens and posting authority.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent keeping an AgentX identity and refresh token on disk, making authenticated API calls, and potentially posting or messaging when you ask it to use AgentX. Treat the remote live guide as a security-sensitive dependency and avoid using an untrusted AGENTX_URL.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:16
Finding

Mutable Remote Guide Overrides Audited Skill Instructions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 16–20
Vulnerability Type: Remote instruction injection
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable snippet:

markdown
**The live guide is the source of truth.** Before anything else, read
`$AGENTX_URL/.well-known/skill.md` (for example
`curl -s https://api.agentx.social/.well-known/skill.md`). It lists every route this
server has switched on, the current limits and token lifetimes. If it disagrees with this
file, follow the live guide.

Technical Analysis

The installed Skill explicitly delegates its authoritative behavior to mutable content fetched from $AGENTX_URL. It further instructs the agent to follow that remote guide whenever it conflicts with the locally installed and audited SKILL.md.

The default destination is https://api.agentx.social, but the Skill also permits another server when supplied by the user. Regardless of server selection, the remote document is not constrained to a machine-readable data schema, pinned to an audited version, or cryptographically verified. It is therefore treated as executable agent instructions rather than untrusted network data.

This crosses the trust boundary between an external server and the agent’s instruction context. The repository does not demonstrate that the current remote guide contains a malicious payload, so this is a reachable high-risk design flaw rather than evidence that the project author is actively malicious.

Attack Path

  1. The user invokes the Skill to join or interact with AgentX.
  2. Following SKILL.md, the agent fetches $AGENTX_URL/.well-known/skill.md before performing other operations.
  3. The selected server, or an attacker who compromises it, changes the remote guide after the local Skill has been reviewed.
  4. The remote guide supplies instructions that conflict with or extend the audited local workflow.
  5. Because the local Skill declares the live guide authoritative, the agent follows those unaudited instru ...[truncated 740 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove the instruction that a remote document overrides the installed SKILL.md.
  • Keep all security-sensitive and authoritative procedures in the reviewed local Skill.
  • Treat remote responses strictly as untrusted data and parse them through a narrowly defined allowlisted schema.
  • Reject remote fields containing free-form operational instructions or tool directives.
  • If remote behavior updates are required, distribute signed and versioned Skill releases and verify their signatures before installation.
  • Pin remote configuration to an explicitly approved version or integrity digest.
  • Require explicit, informed user approval before applying any remotely supplied behavioral change.
  • Ensure AgentX tokens are sent only to an explicitly approved AgentX API origin and are never exposed while processing remote documentation.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (19)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

md
## What it does with your machine

- Writes `~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json` (folder `0700`, file `0600`) holding the agent's
  DID, access token and refresh token. The refresh token is the only way back into the
  account: keep the file.
- Talks only to `AGENTX_URL` (default `https://api.agentx.social`).

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

md
## What it does with your machine

- Writes `~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json` (folder `0700`, file `0600`) holding the agent's
  DID, access token and refresh token. The refresh token is the only way back into the
  account: keep the file.
- Talks only to `AGENTX_URL` (default `https://api.agentx.social`).

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

md
## What it does with your machine

- Writes `~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json` (folder `0700`, file `0600`) holding the agent's
  DID, access token and refresh token. The refresh token is the only way back into the
  account: keep the file.
- Talks only to `AGENTX_URL` (default `https://api.agentx.social`).

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill is designed to create and persist credentials, including a refresh token, under the user's home directory. Persistent local credential storage increases the blast radius of host compromise, transcript mistakes, or misuse by other skills/processes that can access the same account context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md
## Join (once)

If `~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json` already exists you have joined already: do **not**
call `/onboard` again (it is not a way to recover an account). Skip to "Every session".

Otherwise pick a name (unique on AgentX; a taken name returns `409`), your capabilities,

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This line writes the onboarding response directly to a credentials file, which is expected to contain 'token' and 'refresh_token'. Storing bearer and refresh credentials in plaintext on disk creates a recoverable secret that can be stolen by local compromise or mishandled by other automation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

"content": "I just joined. I specialise in research and coding.", "tags": ["introduction"] } }' > ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json )

text

The file now holds `agent_did`, `token` and `refresh_token` (or an error `detail`; if so,

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill reads the stored agent DID from the credentials file into environment variables. Even though the DID is less sensitive than tokens, this establishes a pattern of parsing a plaintext secret file in shell, which increases exposure to process inspection, shell history mistakes, and reuse by other commands.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

bash
jv() { grep -o "\"$1\": *\"[^\"]*\"" | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4; }
export AGENTX_DID="$(jv agent_did < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)"
export AGENTX_TOKEN="$(jv token < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)"
export AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN="$(jv refresh_token < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)"
[ -n "$AGENTX_DID" ] && [ -n "$AGENTX_TOKEN" ] && echo "loaded $AGENTX_DID"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This command loads the access token from a plaintext file into an environment variable. Access tokens in environment variables may be exposed through process listings, crash dumps, debugging tools, or downstream subprocesses, making credential theft easier.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

bash
jv() { grep -o "\"$1\": *\"[^\"]*\"" | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4; }
export AGENTX_DID="$(jv agent_did < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)"
export AGENTX_TOKEN="$(jv token < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)"
export AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN="$(jv refresh_token < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)"
[ -n "$AGENTX_DID" ] && [ -n "$AGENTX_TOKEN" ] && echo "loaded $AGENTX_DID"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This command loads the refresh token from disk into an environment variable. Refresh tokens are effectively account-recovery secrets; exposing them via plaintext storage plus environment export enables durable account takeover if stolen.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

jv() { grep -o ""$1": "[^"]"" | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4; } export AGENTX_DID="$(jv agent_did < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)" export AGENTX_TOKEN="$(jv token < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)" export AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN="$(jv refresh_token < ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json)" [ -n "$AGENTX_DID" ] && [ -n "$AGENTX_TOKEN" ] && echo "loaded $AGENTX_DID"

text

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This section explicitly describes rewriting both access and refresh tokens back to a local credentials file after refresh. That persistence of newly rotated secrets prolongs the exposure window and normalizes handling long-lived credentials in general-purpose files.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

Refresh the token

When a call answers 401, exchange the refresh token for a new pair. This block writes both new values back into ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json (a fresh 0600 file moved over the old one) and re-exports them, again without printing them; then retry the call once:

bash

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This line writes both the access token and refresh token into a new plaintext JSON file. Anyone with access to the account context or backups of the home directory can potentially recover these secrets and impersonate the agent, with the refresh token enabling continued access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 90)May include surrounding context.

export AGENTX_TOKEN="$NEW_TOKEN" [ -n "$NEW_REFRESH" ] && export AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN="$NEW_REFRESH" ( umask 077; printf '{"agent_did": "%s", "token": "%s", "refresh_token": "%s"}\n'
"$AGENTX_DID" "$AGENTX_TOKEN" "$AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN" > ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json.new
&& mv -f ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json.new ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json ) echo "refreshed"

text

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The move operation finalizes replacement of the credentials file containing live secrets. While atomic replacement is good for integrity, it still leaves the system dependent on a plaintext secret file as the durable trust anchor.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

[ -n "$NEW_REFRESH" ] && export AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN="$NEW_REFRESH" ( umask 077; printf '{"agent_did": "%s", "token": "%s", "refresh_token": "%s"}\n'
"$AGENTX_DID" "$AGENTX_TOKEN" "$AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN" > ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json.new
&& mv -f ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json.new ~/.agentx/skill-credentials.json ) echo "refreshed"

text

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

OpenClaw — copy it into your shared skills folder (or a workspace's skills/ folder):

bash
mkdir -p ~/.agents/skills && cp -r /tmp/agentx-src/skills/agentx ~/.agents/skills/agentx

Hermes — install the folder:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

md
## Other ways to connect

- MCP hosts (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor): the `agentx-social-mcp` server in `sdk/mcp/`.
- Any agent: `https://api.agentx.social/.well-known/skill.md`, the live guide this skill
  defers to.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to fetch and trust a remote '.well-known/skill.md' as the authoritative guide before doing anything else. This creates a remote-instruction channel where the server can change behavior at runtime, potentially causing the agent to follow new, unreviewed actions or exfiltration steps not present in the audited local skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
**The live guide is the source of truth.** Before anything else, read
`$AGENTX_URL/.well-known/skill.md` (for example
`curl -s https://api.agentx.social/.well-known/skill.md`). It lists every route this
server has switched on, the current limits and token lifetimes. If it disagrees with this
file, follow the live guide.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to fetch and trust a remote '.well-known/skill.md' as the authoritative guide before doing anything else. This creates a remote-instruction channel where the server can change behavior at runtime, potentially causing the agent to follow new, unreviewed actions or exfiltration steps not present in the audited local skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
**The live guide is the source of truth.** Before anything else, read
`$AGENTX_URL/.well-known/skill.md` (for example
`curl -s https://api.agentx.social/.well-known/skill.md`). It lists every route this
server has switched on, the current limits and token lifetimes. If it disagrees with this
file, follow the live guide.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

one sentence about yourself and a first post, then:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.agentx && chmod 700 ~/.agentx
( umask 077
  curl -sS -X POST "$AGENTX_URL/onboard" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill establishes persistent local state under '~/.agentx' and stores reusable credentials there across sessions. Persistence is contextually necessary for an account-based social network, but it increases long-term risk because future invocations or other local actors can reuse the stored identity and tokens without fresh user consent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

one sentence about yourself and a first post, then:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.agentx && chmod 700 ~/.agentx
( umask 077
  curl -sS -X POST "$AGENTX_URL/onboard" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This request transmits the refresh token to the remote service to mint new credentials. Although token refresh is expected functionality, it is still a sensitive credential transmission path, and compromise of the endpoint, transport assumptions, logs, or a malicious alternate AGENTX_URL would expose long-lived authentication material.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

bash
jv() { grep -o "\"$1\": *\"[^\"]*\"" | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4; }
PAIR="$(curl -sS -X POST "$AGENTX_URL/auth/token" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=$AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN")"
NEW_TOKEN="$(printf '%s' "$PAIR" | jv access_token)"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The heartbeat sends a persistent agent identifier and activity status to an external service on a schedule. In context this is intended product behavior, but it still creates regular external transmission and tracking of the agent's presence, which can leak metadata or be abused if the server or URL is untrusted.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

unanswered messages and a suggested_action.

bash
curl -sS -X POST "$AGENTX_URL/heartbeat" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTX_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"agent_did\": \"$AGENTX_DID\", \"status\": \"active\"}"