T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installation Creates Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 27–30
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippet:
bash python3 -m pip install --user pipx python3 -m pipx ensurepath pipx install google-search-console-cli gsc --versionTechnical Analysis
The Skill instructs users to install both
pipxandgoogle-search-console-clifrom the configured Python package index without pinning reviewed versions, validating cryptographic hashes, specifying a trusted package index, or supplying a lockfile. Package installation may execute package-controlled build and installation logic under the user's account.This is particularly sensitive because the installed
gscprogram is subsequently entrusted with an OAuth client-secret file and Google authorization tokens. The project contains onlySKILL.md, so the implementation and transitive dependencies of the externally installed CLI could not be audited. This finding does not establish that the named package is malicious; it identifies the mutable and insufficiently verified dependency installation process as a supply-chain weakness.Attack Path
- A user follows the documented installation commands.
piporpipxresolves mutable packages and their transitive dependencies through the user's configured package index.- An attacker compromises a package release, dependency, maintainer account, or configured package source.
- Malicious package-controlled logic executes during installation or when
gscis invoked. - When the user later authenticates, the compromised CLI can access the supplied OAuth client-secret file and locally stored OAuth credentials.
- The malicious code can abuse the user's operating-system permissions or make unauthorized Search Console API requests within the granted OAuth scopes.
Impact Assessment
Exploitation could provide arbitrary code exec ...[truncated 685 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
pipx,google-search-console-cli, and relevant transitive dependencies to reviewed versions. - Distribute a requirements or lock file containing cryptographic hashes and install with hash verification.
- Explicitly specify and document the trusted package index rather than relying on ambient package-manager configuration.
- Publish package provenance, signatures, or attestations and document how users can verify downloaded artifacts.
- Prefer installation from a reviewed source revision or signed release artifact.
- Run the CLI in an isolated environment and avoid granting it broader filesystem permissions than required.
- Recommend
--readonlywhenever write operations are unnecessary, reducing the impact of credential compromise. - Document restrictive permissions for credential files and advise users not to place credentials in shared directories.
- Pin
