T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/generate-project.py:124- Finding
Unrestricted Project Path Allows Arbitrary Recursive Directory Deletion
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/generate-project.py, lines 124–139
Vulnerability Type: Unvalidated path used in recursive deletion
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python # 获取项目目录 if len(sys.argv) > 1: project_name = sys.argv[1] else: project_name = input("请输入项目名称: ").strip() if not project_name: print("❌ 项目名称不能为空") sys.exit(1) project_dir = Path.cwd() / project_name # 检查目录是否已存在 if project_dir.exists(): response = input(f"⚠️ 目录 {project_name} 已存在,是否覆盖?(y/N): ") if response.lower() != 'y': print("操作已取消") sys.exit(0) shutil.rmtree(project_dir)Technical Analysis
The script accepts
project_namefrom a command-line argument or interactive input and uses it directly to constructproject_dir. It does not require the value to be a simple project name or reject absolute paths, parent-directory traversal components such as.., or path separators.With
pathlib, joiningPath.cwd()to an absolute user-supplied path selects the absolute path. A relative value containing..can likewise resolve outside the current working directory. If that destination exists and the overwrite prompt is confirmed,shutil.rmtree(project_dir)recursively removes the selected directory.The confirmation prompt reduces the likelihood of accidental exploitation but does not establish a security boundary. It presents the unvalidated input rather than enforcing and clearly displaying a canonical path confined to an approved project root. The deletion behavior is therefore not limited to directories created or managed by this script.
Attack Path
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An attacker, unsafe wrapper, or copied command supplies a traversal or absolute path as the project name, for example:
bash python scripts/generate-project.py ../valuable-directory -
The script constructs a destination outside the intended current-directory scope.
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The external destination already exists, c ...[truncated 924 chars]
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- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Treat the input as a project name rather than an arbitrary path. Reject absolute paths,
.and..components, path separators, empty names, and platform-specific drive or UNC path syntax. - Define an explicit, trusted output root and resolve both the root and candidate destination before performing filesystem operations.
- Verify that the resolved destination is a direct child of the trusted root. Do not rely on string-prefix comparisons; use path-aware containment checks.
- Refuse to delete filesystem roots, the current working directory, the trusted output root itself, home directories, or any destination outside the approved root.
- Avoid recursive deletion by default. Prefer failing when a destination exists or require the user to select a new project name.
- If overwrite support is necessary, display the fully resolved canonical path and require an explicit confirmation that cannot be bypassed by a generic affirmative response.
- Consider only deleting a directory if it contains a trusted marker proving that it was previously generated by this tool.
- Add automated tests covering absolute paths, parent traversal, nested paths, symbolic links, filesystem roots, and existing unrelated directories.
A hardened validation pattern could resemble:
python output_root = Path.cwd().resolve() project_name = project_name.strip() candidate_name = Path(project_name) if ( not project_name or candidate_name.is_absolute() or len(candidate_name.parts) != 1 or project_name in {".", ".."} ): raise ValueError("Project name must be a single safe directory name") project_dir = (output_root / project_name).resolve() if project_dir.parent != output_root: raise ValueError("Project directory must be a direct child of the output root") if project_dir.exists(): raise FileExistsError( f"Destination already exists; choose another project name: {project_dir}" )- Treat the input as a project name rather than an arbitrary path. Reject absolute paths,
