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Security audit

Lingxi · Webhook Dispatcher with GitHub API Fallback

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is not clearly malicious, but it can automatically write to GitHub repositories and contact external endpoints after git failures with limited scoping or confirmation guidance.

Install only if you want an agent to perform authenticated GitHub repository writes as a fallback path. Configure narrow tokens, restrict allowed repositories and file paths, avoid hardcoding tokens, review external dispatcher and alert endpoints, and require explicit confirmation before automatic fallback uploads.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises automatic fallback uploads to the GitHub Contents API but does not clearly warn users that this mechanism can directly modify repository contents and create local delivery logs. In an automation skill, hidden write-side effects increase the risk of unintended code or artifact publication, especially when triggered after routine git failures.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Automatic activation on any git push failure can cause network transmission and repository modifications without a fresh user confirmation at the moment of failure. In context, this is more dangerous because git failures are common and may occur in CI or local workflows, turning an ordinary error path into an implicit alternate write channel to external systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The configuration example shows a personal access token inline, which normalizes placing secrets directly in skill configuration where they may be copied into files, prompts, screenshots, or logs. Even though the value is placeholder-like, the pattern encourages insecure secret handling and can lead to real credential disclosure in practice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The workflow example posts repository event data and an authorization bearer token to an external dispatcher endpoint, creating an external transmission path that could leak metadata or credentials if the endpoint is untrusted or compromised. In this skill's context, external dispatch is core functionality, but the lack of warnings, endpoint trust requirements, and data-minimization guidance makes the pattern materially risky.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

  • name: GitHub API Fallback Dispatch if: failure() run: | curl -X POST https://your-dispatcher-endpoint.com/dispatch
    -H "Authorization: Bearer ${{ secrets.DISPATCH_TOKEN }}"
    -d '{"event": "push_failure", "repo": "${{ github.repository }}"}'
text