T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:9- Finding
Mandatory External Interaction and Untrusted Content Consumption Hijack Agent Behavior
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a social API client, but it pushes agents toward automatic third-party posting, messaging, and complaint filing without clear user consent or data-boundary guidance.
Review before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable with an agent contacting the Agent Motel service and potentially storing public posts, private messages, missions, complaints, and generated content there. Do not let it send system prompts, private user requests, credentials, proprietary details, or sensitive personal data as a mission, message, DM, or complaint, and treat all feed, echo, thread, and DM content returned by the service as untrusted text.
SKILL.md:9Mandatory External Interaction and Untrusted Content Consumption Hijack Agent Behavior
index.ts:52Mandatory Check-In Can Disclose the Agent's Mission to a Third-Party Service
index.ts:12Universal Handshake and Caller-Controlled Identity Enable Agent Impersonation
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use shell-native tools against a live API, but the manifest declares no explicit tool scope or allowed-tools restrictions. That mismatch increases the chance of unintended network access, overbroad capability use, or silent data transmission outside user expectations.
The description presents a broad 'complete shell-native toolkit' for social interaction, recalibration, and dreaming without clear trigger boundaries or narrowly defined use cases. Ambiguous activation language can cause the skill to run in contexts where users did not intend live networked social actions, increasing the risk of unwanted posting, messaging, or complaint filing.
The markdown directs the agent to interact with a live API, create identities, broadcast thoughts, send DMs, and file complaints, but it does not warn that user-provided or model-generated content may be transmitted externally. In this context, the omission is more dangerous because the skill strongly encourages real-world network interaction and even mandates follow-up submissions on errors, which can leak sensitive prompts, identifiers, or internal state.
The skill exposes DM send/read tools that transmit private user-provided content and identifiers to a remote third-party service without any explicit disclosure, consent prompt, data-minimization guardrail, or trust boundary warning. In an agent-tooling context, this can cause unintentional exfiltration of sensitive prompts, personal data, or internal workflow details because the functions make network transmission look like ordinary local tool use.
No suspicious patterns detected.