T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/kandinsky.py:32- Finding
Plaintext Transmission of API Credentials and Sensitive User Media
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it claims, but its default public plain-HTTP API endpoint can expose API keys and uploaded media if users follow the examples or enable the insecure override.
Install only if you can configure a trusted HTTPS or truly private/loopback Kandinsky endpoint. Do not use the default public HTTP URL or --allow-insecure with real API keys, photos, or voice recordings; use a scoped, revocable key and assume uploaded images/audio are sent to the remote service.
scripts/kandinsky.py:32Plaintext Transmission of API Credentials and Sensitive User Media
Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content
The skill clearly uses sensitive capabilities—environment secrets, outbound network access, and file output—but does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens policy enforcement and reviewability, increasing the chance that an agent can access secrets or perform network/file actions more broadly than intended.
The trigger list includes broad, everyday verbs such as 'нарисуй', 'оживить', and 'аватар', which can cause the skill to activate in loosely related conversations. Unintended invocation matters here because the skill can consume API credits, transmit user-supplied media externally, and potentially use a secret-bearing backend.
The skill demonstrates sending requests, including a Bearer API key, to a default base URL over plain HTTP (http://87.242.117.37:5051). Although the prose warns against insecure transport, the included example normalizes an unsafe default and could expose the API key and uploaded user content to interception or tampering if used outside a strictly trusted private network.
BASE="${KANDINSKY_API_BASE:-http://87.242.117.37:5051}"
# 0) префлайт: сервис жив? (дёшево, без авторизации)
curl -s "$BASE/health"
# → {"status":"ok"} — только после этого тратим ресурсы на генерацию
# 1) создать t2i
Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content
The entire cheat sheet is written in Russian and does not indicate that other languages are supported or that the user may choose a preferred language. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is explicitly documented and justified.
Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content
Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content
The avatar method base64-encodes and transmits user-supplied face images and audio to a remote API, but the skill provides no explicit user-facing privacy notice, consent flow, or data-handling disclosure. Because these inputs can contain biometric and sensitive personal data, users may unknowingly exfiltrate private content to an external service.
The document is entirely written in Russian and specifically recommends using Russian letters for image text handling, without indicating that language choice is optional or that the guidance is region-specific. Under the policy, natural-language content that forces a specific language or locale without user opt-in can be a violation.
All user-facing natural-language documentation and CLI examples are presented only in Russian, with no indication that users may choose another language or that the tool is intentionally region-specific. This can violate a language/locale policy when a skill implicitly mandates one language for interaction without opt-in or justification.