T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/roadshow-capture.py:42- Finding
Weak URL Validation Allows Corporate Email Disclosure to Attacker-Controlled Sites
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill does what it says, but it automates access to sensitive roadshow content with weak URL controls, local data retention, and reduced browser isolation.
Review before installing. Use this only for roadshows you are authorized to access and copy, avoid untrusted or shortened URLs, prefer setting the email only for the current process, store outputs in a restricted directory, and consider running the capture in an isolated container or VM until URL validation, sandboxing, dependency pinning, and .env handling are improved.
scripts/roadshow-capture.py:42Weak URL Validation Allows Corporate Email Disclosure to Attacker-Controlled Sites
scripts/dealroadshow-capture.py:45Chromium Sandbox Disabled While Processing Remote Web Content
SKILL.md:14Automatically Installed Python Dependencies Are Unpinned and Unverified
SKILL.md:40Documentation Directs Persistent Plaintext Storage of User Email
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Resolve email: CLI arg → env var → agent 提问后写入 .env
email = args.email or os.environ.get("NRS_EMAIL")
assert email, "NRS_EMAIL 未设置。请通过 --email 参数或 export NRS_EMAIL=your-email@company.com 设置邮箱。"
Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.
print()
# Run
env = os.environ.copy()
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env)
sys.exit(proc.returncode)
The skill clearly requires shell execution and environment-variable handling, but it does not declare an explicit tool/permission scope. That creates a governance gap: an agent or platform may grant broader execution than users expect, reducing visibility into sensitive operations like launching browsers, writing files, and reading configuration.
The skill states that it will save the user's roadshow email into scripts/.env, but it does not present this as a prominent security/privacy warning or discuss retention and access implications. Storing identifiers in a local dotenv file can expose user data to other local processes, users, backups, or accidental commits if the file is not protected.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
✅ pp.evaluate('document.querySelector(".btn-agree").click()')
❌ page.get_by_text("Agree").click() — doesn't trigger
4. "Resume previous session" / "Start from beginning" prompt
Always pick "Start from beginning" (hard rule, no user prompt)
5. URL → /presentation/v2/{id}/MediaSlides
The document provides explicit instructions to bypass/auto-accept a legal disclaimer and to capture the full slide deck into screenshots/PDF, but it includes no warning, authorization checks, or guidance about licensing, confidentiality, or privacy constraints. In the context of an investor-roadshow capture skill, this materially increases the risk of unauthorized reproduction and distribution of potentially restricted presentation content.
The script reads an email address from a command-line argument or environment variable and fills it into a remote page before launching the roadshow. While this is part of the automation flow, the file does not clearly warn the user that personal data from arguments or environment variables will be submitted to an external service.
The script captures presentation slides and saves them as PNGs and a PDF under a local output directory, which can expose sensitive investor or deal materials to other local users, backups, or downstream processes if the storage location is not secured. In this skill's context, the entire purpose is to extract and persist presentation content, so the risk is real even if intentional and not overtly malicious.
This code captures slide images and writes them to the output directory, then combines them into a PDF. Although file output is part of the tool's function, there is no explicit warning or disclosure that presentation content will be stored locally as PNG files and a PDF, which may affect user data handling expectations.
This code embeds all natural-language descriptions, argument help text, and status/error messages in Chinese only. That creates a locale/language policy concern because users are not given any option to select another language or indication that the tool is intended only for a Chinese-speaking audience.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
# Run
env = os.environ.copy()
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env)
sys.exit(proc.returncode)
The installation steps tell users to set NRS_EMAIL directly in their shell environment, which involves handling personal data, but the document does not warn that this value may persist in shell history or be visible to subprocesses. For markdown files, privacy-affecting behavior should be disclosed when user data is involved.
The module docstring and assertion messages use Chinese without offering any language choice. Under the language-policy check, this can be a locale/language constraint that is not explicitly documented as region-specific or presented as an opt-in.
The script accesses an environment variable containing an email address and then uses it to interact with the remote site. While the argument help mentions the env var fallback, there is no explicit disclosure that personal data from the environment will be consumed and transmitted to the target service.