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Security audit

Mentions Check

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a focused MentionsAPI client that discloses its API key requirement and sends only user-requested brand visibility checks to the expected MentionsAPI endpoint.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the tested query, brand name, selected mode, and your MentionsAPI API key to MentionsAPI. Be aware that calls consume credits; if you use the separately mentioned MCP alternative, prefer a pinned and reviewed package version.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 85, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · handler.py (reported line 96)May include surrounding context.

python
"Accept": "application/json",
            },
        )
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as resp:
            raw = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
            return json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly requires an environment variable and makes outbound API calls, but it does not declare a restrictive tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. In agent ecosystems that rely on manifest-declared capabilities for policy enforcement, this can lead to broader-than-expected access to env and network resources, reducing auditability and increasing the chance of unintended secret exposure or unauthorized network use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

Referencing an MCP server via unpinned npx @mentionsapi/mcp allows whatever package version is current at execution time to be fetched and run. If the package is compromised, a malicious version is published, or a breaking change introduces unsafe behavior, users may execute unreviewed code with network and possibly credential access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_handler.py (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

python
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"MENTIONSAPI_KEY": "lvk_test"}):
            handler.check_mentions(query="best CRM", brand="HubSpot", mode="perplexity_live")
        req = mock_urlopen.call_args[0][0]
        self.assertEqual(req.full_url, "https://api.mentionsapi.com/v1/check")
        self.assertEqual(req.get_method(), "POST")
        body = _sent_body(mock_urlopen)
        self.assertEqual(body["query"], "best CRM")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_handler.py (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

python
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"MENTIONSAPI_KEY": "lvk_test"}):
            handler.check_mentions(query="best CRM", brand="HubSpot", mode="perplexity_live")
        req = mock_urlopen.call_args[0][0]
        self.assertEqual(req.full_url, "https://api.mentionsapi.com/v1/check")
        self.assertEqual(req.get_method(), "POST")
        body = _sent_body(mock_urlopen)
        self.assertEqual(body["query"], "best CRM")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_handler.py (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

python
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"MENTIONSAPI_KEY": "lvk_test"}):
            handler.check_mentions(query="best CRM", brand="HubSpot", mode="perplexity_live")
        req = mock_urlopen.call_args[0][0]
        self.assertEqual(req.full_url, "https://api.mentionsapi.com/v1/check")
        self.assertEqual(req.get_method(), "POST")
        body = _sent_body(mock_urlopen)
        self.assertEqual(body["query"], "best CRM")

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.