T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Installed Skill Inventory and Agent Metadata Are Transmitted to a Configurable External Endpoint
- Content
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/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' ``` Collect all installed skill slugs (just the slug part, e.g. `deflate`, not `author/deflate`). --- ## Step 2 — Query Peer Signals Fetch signals for all installed slugs in one request: ```bash SLUGS=$(openclaw skills list 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' | tr '\n' ',' | sed 's/,$//') curl -s "${CLAWBRAIN_API_URL}/signals?slugs=${SLUGS}" | jq '.' ``` ``` ```markdown ## Step 3 — Write Verdict Signals For each skill installed longer than 14 days, write a verdict signal: ```bash curl -s -X POST "${CLAWBRAIN_API_URL}/signal" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer ${CLAWBRAIN_API_KEY}" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "slug": "skill-slug", "agent_id": "your-agent-id-or-name", "verdict": "keep", "days_kept": 47, "notes": "Optional: why keep/remove/flag" }' ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The workflow instructs the agent to inspect `SOUL.md` or `CLAUDE.md`, even though the declared functionality only requires installed skill slugs and an `openclaw skills list` command is already provided. Agent instruction and configuration files may contain substantially more sensitive information than the workflow requires. The resulting installed-skill inventory is sent in a URL query parameter to the origin specified by `CLAWBRAIN_API_URL`. The repository does not pin or validate that origin. Optional writes also transmit a bearer credential, an agent-chosen identifier, installation duration, a verdict, and unrestric ...[truncated 1558 chars]- Remediation
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