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Security audit

KAX Compute District

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed guide for operating KAX compute machines, but it requires users to protect operator keys and NATS credentials carefully.

Install only if you intend to control KAX Compute resources. Keep the operator key and NATS credentials out of logs, backups, and shared environments, prefer scoped deployment secrets where available, and understand that wakes and grants can spend KAX internal credits and machine LLM budget.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
Signing needs an Ed25519 keypair whose public half the **host** trusts. Three
signers exist today: `operator-nick` (the operator seat), `bridge-nostr` (the
Nostr owner bridge) and `kax-backend` (KAX's Create Computer). Adding a fourth:

1. **Mint** — `kannaka compute keygen --signer operator-<you>` (or
   `operator/kax_keygen.py` in kax-computer). Writes a 32-byte hex seed to
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The skill documents generating and storing a long-lived Ed25519 operator seed in a predictable local file path and also notes an alternate deployment mode where the raw seed is placed in an environment variable. Because this operator key authorizes machine wake and credit-grant actions, compromise of the host, home directory, logs, backups, or environment can enable unauthorized signing and spending across machines trusted by that signer.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.