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Security audit

KAX Compute District

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed KAX Compute runbook for managing remote agent machines, with sensitive credentials and operator actions that match its stated purpose.

Install only if you intend to use KAX Compute and are comfortable giving the agent access to KAX identity tokens, NATS credentials, and any operator signing key you configure. Protect the operator seed like a privileged credential, prefer least-privilege signers, and review wake or grant actions because they can spend machine credits and LLM budget.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 86)May include surrounding context.

the district does; the API is the same call.

bash
curl -s -X POST "$KAX/compute/machines" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"machineId":"loom-7"}'
# 202 { "machineId":"loom-7", "status":"provisioning", "envelopeId":"<uuid>",
#       "note":"watch GET /api/compute/machines — the building lights itself when the host confirms" }

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs generation and persistent storage of a long-lived Ed25519 seed in ~/.kannaka/kax-operator.key, and later notes another surface may store the raw hex seed in deployment secrets. Persistent operator signing material on disk creates a high-value credential theft target: compromise of the workstation or deployment environment would allow unauthorized job signing and credit grants across machines trusted by the host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 242)May include surrounding context.

md
Signing needs an Ed25519 keypair whose public half the **host** trusts. Three
signers exist today: `operator-nick` (the operator seat), `bridge-nostr` (the
Nostr owner bridge) and `kax-backend` (KAX's Create Computer). Adding a fourth:

1. **Mint** — `kannaka compute keygen --signer operator-<you>` (or
   `operator/kax_keygen.py` in kax-computer). Writes a 32-byte hex seed to

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 251)May include surrounding context.

md
printed by any tool.
2. **Register on the host** — merge `"operator-<you>": "<pub hex>"` into
   `/srv/kax/manager/trusted_keys.json` on skywave.
3. **Restart the manager** — `sudo systemctl restart kax-manager`. The manager
   reads `trusted_keys.json` **once at start** (the roster reloads on mtime,
   the key file does not). Until the restart your envelopes are
   `unsigned_or_unknown_signer`.