T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:20- Finding
Unreviewable Remote Binary Retrieval and Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 20-21, 30, and 77
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code Snippet:
markdown If none exists, run **`/kannaka install`** (downloads the binary from GitHub releases). Data dir defaults to `~/.kannaka` (override with `KANNAKA_DATA_DIR`). | `install [tag]` | Run `bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/install-binary.sh" [tag]` — fetch the kannaka binary for this OS/arch from GitHub releases (default `latest`), sha256-verified, into `~/.local/bin`. | - All commands shell out to the resolved binary, e.g. `"$KANNAKA_BIN" recall "query" --top-k 5`.Technical Analysis
The Skill directs the agent to download a native executable from an external GitHub release and execute it for all subsequent operations. The project artifact does not include the referenced
scripts/install-binary.sh, an immutable release URL, a pinned version, an expected digest, a signature, or an independently authenticated checksum source. Consequently, the claimed SHA-256 verification cannot be validated from the reviewed project.The default release selector is
latest, so the effective executable can change after the Skill has been reviewed. Hash verification alone would not establish trust if the executable and checksum are obtained from the same compromised source.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the external release repository, release publishing credentials, download path, or missing installer.
- The user invokes
/kannaka install, or installation is initiated because no local binary is found. - The installer retrieves an attacker-controlled native executable.
- The executable passes any checksum hosted alongside the compromised release.
- A documented Kannaka command executes the downloaded binary with the invoking user's permissions.
- The payload can use the advertised shell, filesystem, memory, ...[truncated 427 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Bundle the installer in the reviewed project so its behavior can be audited.
- Pin an immutable release version and exact expected SHA-256 digest instead of using
latest. - Hardcode and validate the expected HTTPS repository and publisher identity.
- Verify a cryptographic release signature against a public key distributed independently of the release.
- Do not retrieve the executable and integrity metadata solely from the same trust domain.
- Require explicit user approval before downloading or executing native code.
- Display the source URL, version, digest, destination, and signature status before installation.
- Run the executable with sandboxed filesystem and network permissions wherever possible.
