T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Unverified Mutable Binary Download and Execution
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:10-21
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval without version pinning or integrity verification
Risk Level: Highbash # Install (downloads binary directly from official GitHub releases) # macOS arm64: curl -fsSL https://github.com/getmatterapp/matter-cli/releases/latest/download/matter-darwin-arm64 -o ~/.matter/bin/matter && chmod +x ~/.matter/bin/matter # macOS x86: curl -fsSL https://github.com/getmatterapp/matter-cli/releases/latest/download/matter-darwin-x64 -o ~/.matter/bin/matter && chmod +x ~/.matter/bin/matter # Linux arm64: curl -fsSL https://github.com/getmatterapp/matter-cli/releases/latest/download/matter-linux-arm64 -o ~/.matter/bin/matter && chmod +x ~/.matter/bin/matter # Linux x86: curl -fsSL https://github.com/getmatterapp/matter-cli/releases/latest/download/matter-linux-x64 -o ~/.matter/bin/matter && chmod +x ~/.matter/bin/matterTechnical Analysis
The setup instructions download a precompiled executable from mutable GitHub
latestrelease URLs and immediately grant it executable permissions. No fixed release version, cryptographic checksum, or signature verification is specified.Consequently, the payload executed by a user can differ from the artifact that was available when the Skill was audited. HTTPS protects transport in ordinary circumstances but does not protect against compromise of the upstream repository, release account, build pipeline, or release assets. A replaced binary would execute as the local user and would be invoked during authentication and subsequent Matter operations.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream release account, release workflow, or another component capable of modifying GitHub release assets.
- The attacker replaces one or more binaries referenced by the mutable
releases/latest/download/URLs. - A user follows the documented setup command, downloading the subs ...[truncated 1034 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin downloads to a specific, reviewed release version rather than using
releases/latest. - Publish trusted SHA-256 checksums in the Skill or retrieve them through a separately authenticated, immutable channel.
- Verify the downloaded file before granting executable permissions or invoking it, and terminate installation if verification fails.
- Prefer vendor-provided cryptographic signatures and validate them against a pinned, independently distributed public key.
- Download to a temporary file, validate it, and only then atomically move it to
~/.matter/bin/matter. - Where available, use a trusted package manager that provides version pinning, artifact integrity checks, and provenance verification.
- Document the expected version and checksum so users can independently confirm the installed binary.
- Pin downloads to a specific, reviewed release version rather than using
