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Security audit

Apollo Endo

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is not overtly malicious, but it can persistently tune global agent behavior and inspect cross-skill activity with broad triggers and weak controls.

Install only if you want a skill that may influence global agent behavior across tasks. Review and narrow its triggers, require explicit confirmation before persistent parameter changes, and avoid running the script with broad access to OpenClaw memory or other skills' private state.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
scripts/endo/endo-check.sh:13
Finding

Direct Access to Agent Memory and Cross-Skill State

Content
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/dev/null) [ -z "$count" ] && count=0 echo $count else echo 0 fi } # 获取对话轮数 get_turn_count() { local memory_file="/root/.openclaw/workspace/memory/$(date +%Y-%m-%d).md" if [ -f "$memory_file" ]; then grep -c "^## " "$memory_file" 2>/dev/null || echo 0 else echo 0 fi } ``` ### Technical Analysis The script directly opens the Agent's daily persistent memory file and another Skill's task-state file. Although the current implementation only calculates file-size, heading-count, and active-task metrics, it crosses component boundaries instead of using a dedicated, least-privilege telemetry interface. The hard-coded `/root/.openclaw/workspace` paths also assume execution in a privileged account's workspace. If the Skill is invoked with access to that workspace, it can inspect metadata derived from persistent Agent activity and from another Skill's state. The current code does not transmit the underlying contents and does not provide a direct mechanism for obtaining additional operating-system privileges. ### Attack Path 1. The Skill is invoked in an environment where it can read `/root/.openclaw/workspace`. 2. `get_token_usage` opens the current da ...[truncated 1234 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/endo/endo-check.sh:5
Finding

Predictable State-File Overwrite Without Symlink Protection

Content
View full analysis
"$STATE_FILE" << EOF { "tokens": $tokens, "active_tasks": $tasks, "turn_count": $turns, "load": $load, "adjustment": "$adjustment", "checked_at": "$(date -Iseconds)" } EOF ``` ### Technical Analysis The script writes generated JSON to a fixed, predictable path using shell redirection. The operation truncates the destination before writing and does not verify whether `state.json` is a regular file, whether it is a symbolic link, or whether the parent directory has safe ownership and permissions. If a less-privileged attacker can modify the `.endo` directory or replace `state.json` with a symbolic link, and the script later executes with greater filesystem privileges, shell redirection follows the symbolic link and overwrites its target. This is a conditional privilege-boundary issue: it requires attacker write access to the state directory and a more privileged invocation of the script. The replacement content is constrained to the generated JSON document, so the attacker cannot freely select arbitrary content. Nevertheless, truncating and replacing a chosen writable target may corrupt configuration or application-state files. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker obtains write access to `/root/.openclaw/workspace/.endo`, or to an equivalent state directory in a deployment with unsafe permissions. 2. The attacker removes or renames `state.json`. 3. The attacker creates `state.json` as a symbolic link to a file writable by the account that will execute the Skill. 4. A more privileged user or service invokes `endo-check.sh`. 5. The shell processes `cat > "$STATE_FILE"` and follows the symbolic link. 6. The lin ...[truncated 878 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest's read_when conditions are broad natural-language concepts like '参数', '设置', and '调整', which are likely to appear in ordinary conversation. This can cause unintended activation of the skill, allowing it to influence global behavior or user experience outside its intended scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The trigger list contains highly generic keywords including '参数', '偏好', '设置', '调整', and '系统状态', all of which can occur in many benign requests. In a skill designed to tune global parameters, accidental invocation is more dangerous because it may change broad system behavior rather than a single task-local setting.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documented workflow includes writing a parameter state file and notifying other skills that new parameters are active, but it provides no safeguards, user warning, audit trail, or rollback mechanism. Because these are global parameters affecting other skills, persisted state changes can silently alter future behavior across the system and amplify the effect of accidental or malicious activation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.