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Security audit

Apollo Coordinator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a local multi-agent coordination guide with a support status-check script; it has some under-disclosed local state handling but no evidence of exfiltration, destructive behavior, or deception.

Install only if you want a Chinese-language coordinator workflow and are comfortable with a local status script reading OpenClaw workflow/task metadata and writing coordinator state. The publisher should document the script behavior and fix JSON-safe output generation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/coordinator/coordinator-check.sh:126
Finding

Unescaped Workflow Data Allows JSON State Injection

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null || echo "error" else echo "no_workflow" fi } ``` The resulting value is inserted directly into a JSON heredoc: ```bash cat > "$STATE_FILE" << EOF { "workflow": "$workflow", "gates_passed": $passed, "gates_total": $total, "skills_with_check": $with_check, "skills_with_version": $with_version, "skills_total": $skill_total, "pending_tasks": $pending, "score": $score, "checked_at": "$(date -Iseconds)" } EOF ``` ### Technical Analysis The `phase` property is read from `/root/.openclaw/workspace/.workflow/state.json` and printed as raw text. The script subsequently places that text inside a quoted JSON value without applying JSON escaping. A `phase` value containing quotation marks, backslashes, control characters, or newlines can therefore break out of the intended `workflow` string. This can inject additional properties into the generated `.coordinator/state.json` file or make the file invalid. For example, a valid source JSON document could contain a value logically equivalent to: ```json { "phase": "ok\",\n \"forged_state\": true,\n \"padding\": \"" } ``` When interpolated by the heredoc, this introduces attacker-selected structure into the generated status document. This is a data-integrity vulnerability rather than shell command injection: shell metacharacters resulting from variable expansion are not reparsed as shell syntax. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker or compromised component obtains permission to modify `/root/.opencl ...[truncated 1379 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

声明描述的是一个“把复杂任务交给多个小助手同时做并汇总结果”的协调执行能力。但实际代码是一个状态检测脚本:检查 workflow phase、gate 文件通过情况、skills 是否有 check/version、待处理任务数量,并生成状态报告保存到 state.json。虽然名称和输出文案与“coordinator”有关,但它并不实际创建、分发、协调或汇总多个助手的工作结果。其主要目的与声明存在实质偏差,且还进行了未在声明中体现的本地状态文件读写。因此应判定为描述与行为不匹配。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill’s natural-language description is written as a Chinese-only user-facing instruction and does not indicate that users may choose another language or locale. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a language/locale policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad and have no stated exclusion conditions, so the skill could activate in contexts where a user merely mentions task decomposition or multi-agent coordination conceptually. Unintended invocation can route user requests into unnecessary orchestration flows, increasing the chance of confusion, incorrect delegation, or accidental processing of tasks that should remain single-agent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.