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Security audit

Strava Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Strava-to-Transition API guide; it uses sensitive fitness data, but the remote API access is disclosed and aligned with its purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable giving Transition and your agent access to Strava-linked activity data, performance metrics, profile details, prompts, and prior coach chats. Protect the TRANSITION_API_KEY like a password, revoke it if no longer needed, and review Transition's privacy and account controls before using personalized endpoints.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (14)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Try it right now — no API key needed:

```bash
curl "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/wod?sport=run&duration=45"
```

For personalized features (your Strava data, training plan, AI coach), you need a Transition account + API key. See [Getting an API Key](#getting-an-api-key) below.
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Try it right now — no API key needed:

```bash
curl "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/wod?sport=run&duration=45"
```

For personalized features (your Strava data, training plan, AI coach), you need a Transition account + API key. See [Getting an API Key](#getting-an-api-key) below.
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Try it right now — no API key needed:

```bash
curl "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/wod?sport=run&duration=45"
```

For personalized features (your Strava data, training plan, AI coach), you need a Transition account + API key. See [Getting an API Key](#getting-an-api-key) below.
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The README explicitly instructs users to send personalized Strava-derived data to a third-party API for analysis and coaching, but it does not provide any meaningful privacy, data-sharing, retention, or consent warning. This creates a real privacy/security risk because users may disclose sensitive health, location, and training information without understanding how that data is processed or shared.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
curl -X POST -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"message": "How did my long run this week compare to last week?"}' \
  "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/coach/chat"

# Get your fitness/fatigue/form metrics
curl -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
This example instructs users to send authenticated, personalized fitness questions about their Strava data to an external API using an API key, but the README gives no adjacent warning about privacy, handling of personal training data, or potential exposure of sensitive health/location information. In the context of a fitness-data skill, this is materially more sensitive than a generic API call because the transmitted content may reveal private behavioral and health-related information.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Get your fitness/fatigue/form metrics
curl -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/performance/pmc"
```

---
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
This example sends authenticated performance metrics derived from a user's Strava account to an external endpoint without any explicit disclosure of privacy implications. Because performance-management metrics can reflect detailed health, training load, and activity patterns, omission of a clear data-sharing warning creates a legitimate privacy vulnerability in the documentation and user-consent flow.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill encourages users to chat with and analyze Strava activity data via a remote AI service, but it does not clearly warn that personal fitness history, training patterns, and profile information will be transmitted to a third-party endpoint. This creates a real privacy risk because users or downstream agents may disclose sensitive health- and location-adjacent data without informed consent.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Generate a random structured workout — no account needed.

```bash
curl "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/wod?sport=run&duration=45"
```

**Parameters:**
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
curl -X POST -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"message": "How did my long run this week compare to last week?"}' \
  "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/coach/chat"
```

Example questions:
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
This endpoint sends free-form user messages plus authenticated access to a remote AI coach that has full context on the user's Strava activities and performance. In this skill context, that means potentially sensitive fitness, health-inference, behavioral, and historical activity data is transmitted to a third party, and the documentation does not provide adequate privacy, retention, or minimization guidance.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/workouts?start=2026-02-09&end=2026-02-15"
```

**Parameters:**
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This request retrieves scheduled workouts for a date range using an API key tied to the user's account, which means personal training schedule data is fetched from a third-party service. The transmission is part of intended functionality, but it is still a real privacy-sensitive data flow that lacks nearby warning or handling guidance.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/performance/pmc"
```

### Performance Stats
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The PMC endpoint exposes derived fitness, fatigue, and form metrics based on the user's Strava activities. These metrics can reveal sensitive health and training-condition inferences, so sending or retrieving them from a remote service without clear privacy disclosure is a meaningful privacy vulnerability in this context.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/performance/stats"
```

### Athlete Profile
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The performance stats endpoint returns FTP, threshold paces, heart rate zones, and similar derived metrics, which are personal athletic and health-adjacent data. Because these are accessed through a remote third-party API and the skill does not foreground that sensitivity, the transmission presents a legitimate privacy risk.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/profile"
```

### Chat History
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The athlete profile endpoint likely returns identifying profile information associated with the user's Strava-connected account. Accessing this data via a remote third-party API without explicit privacy notice or data-use constraints increases the risk of unintended exposure of personal identifiers and account-linked metadata.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $TRANSITION_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.transition.fun/api/v1/coach/history"
```

## Rate Limits
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The chat history endpoint involves retrieval of prior AI conversations that may contain sensitive prompts, fitness details, scheduling, and inferred health information. Exposing or normalizing access to stored conversation history without strong privacy disclosure and retention guidance is dangerous because historical chat logs often contain more sensitive context than a single request.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.