T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:92- Finding
Token Launch API Requires Transmission of a Solana Wallet Private Key
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a Swarms API guide, but it documents workflows that send Solana wallet private keys to remote services, which is unsafe enough to require review before installation.
Review this skill carefully before installing or using its token and ATP sections. Do not paste a funded or primary Solana wallet private key into these examples or send it to a remote API; prefer client-side wallet signing, testnet or low-balance burner wallets, and scoped authorization flows. Ordinary Swarms API examples still send your prompts and API key to Swarms, which is expected for the service but should be used only with data you are comfortable sharing.
SKILL.md:92Token Launch API Requires Transmission of a Solana Wallet Private Key
references/atp-protocol.md:45ATP Payment Protocol Sends Wallet Private Keys to Remote Endpoints
The request flow instructs clients to send a wallet private key in an HTTP header, which is an extremely sensitive secret that can be exposed through reverse proxies, middleware, access logs, tracing systems, browser tooling, and upstream services. Even though the doc says not to log keys, the design itself normalizes transmission of raw private keys and does not provide a strong warning or a safer alternative.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"task": "Your task here"
}
response = requests.post(
"https://api.swarms.world/v1/agent/completions",
headers={"x-api-key": API_KEY, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json=payload
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"task": "Your task here"
}
response = requests.post(
"https://api.swarms.world/v1/agent/completions",
headers={"x-api-key": API_KEY, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json=payload
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"task": "Your task here"
}
response = requests.post(
"https://api.swarms.world/v1/agent/completions",
headers={"x-api-key": API_KEY, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json=payload
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"task": "Your task here"
}
response = requests.post(
"https://api.swarms.world/v1/swarm/completions",
headers={"x-api-key": API_KEY, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json=payload
The token launch example explicitly instructs users to place a Solana wallet private key into the JSON payload sent to a remote service, but it does not include a strong warning about the sensitivity of that secret or safer handling guidance. In a skill meant to be copied by users, this normalizes exfiltration of a high-value credential and can directly lead to wallet compromise or irreversible fund loss if users paste real private keys.
This duplicate finding points to the token launch request that includes a private key in the JSON body. The danger is not merely the outbound request, but that the example encourages transmission of a wallet secret to a third party, which can enable full wallet takeover and irreversible blockchain asset loss.
"private_key": "[1,2,3,...]" # Solana wallet private key
}
response = requests.post(
"https://swarms.world/api/token/launch",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer API_KEY", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json=payload
This duplicate finding points to the token launch request that includes a private key in the JSON body. The danger is not merely the outbound request, but that the example encourages transmission of a wallet secret to a third party, which can enable full wallet takeover and irreversible blockchain asset loss.
"private_key": "[1,2,3,...]" # Solana wallet private key
}
response = requests.post(
"https://swarms.world/api/token/launch",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer API_KEY", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json=payload
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
GET https://api.swarms.world/health
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
GET https://api.swarms.world/health
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
GET https://api.swarms.world/health
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
)
response = await client.post( url="https://api.example.com/v1/chat", json={"message": "Hello!"} )
The documentation explicitly recommends fail_on_settlement_error=False, and the server example also shows that setting. In this payment-gating design, graceful degradation can result in protected responses being delivered even when settlement fails, enabling unpaid access to metered agent services and undermining the core security and billing control.
The documentation explicitly instructs users to send a Solana wallet private key to a remote API, but provides no warning about the extreme sensitivity of that secret, no guidance on secure handling, and no indication of safer alternatives. In a multi-agent/orchestration skill, this is especially dangerous because developers may automate the flow, log request payloads, or pass secrets through agents and toolchains, increasing the likelihood of key compromise and irreversible wallet theft.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"task": "Your task"
}
response = requests.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/v1/agent/completions",
headers=headers, json=payload, stream=True
)
The documentation explicitly states that autonomous sub-agents may be given file operation tools such as create_file, update_file, read_file, list_directory, and delete_file, but it provides no warning about the risks of unintended file access, modification, or deletion. In a multi-agent delegation context, this is more dangerous because spawned sub-agents can amplify mistakes or unsafe prompts across multiple concurrent tasks, increasing the chance of destructive or overbroad filesystem actions.
This markdown file includes example code that transmits credentials via request headers to a remote endpoint, but the surrounding documentation does not warn users that the example performs a network call carrying an API key. Under the markdown-file criteria for missing user warnings, examples that affect privacy or system integrity should disclose such behavior.
This markdown file defines a tool with the description "Search for information on a topic" and parameter text "Search query," but it does not specify boundaries, exclusions, or narrower trigger conditions. In documentation for tool definitions, this kind of broad natural-language description can encourage overly general invocation behavior because almost any user request could be interpreted as matching the tool.