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Security audit

TikTok全球数据采集

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This TikTok data skill is mostly documented, but it includes high-risk flows that can send TikTok session cookies and possible login passwords to a third-party API.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use it only if you trust MaxHub/aconfig.cn with the data sent to it, avoid primary TikTok accounts, do not provide TikTok passwords, and treat any TikTok cookies as full account credentials that should be revoked after use.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
references/api-user.md:161
Finding

Third-Party Transmission of Login-Equivalent TikTok Session Cookies

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/api-user.md:161-188; related transmission policy in SKILL.md:67-79
Vulnerability Type: Session credential disclosure and excessive privilege
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown
## fetch_user_collect

`GET /api/v1/tiktok/web/fetch_user_collect`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/web/fetch_user_collect -->

### Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Required | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| cookie | string | ✅ | User cookie | Your_Cookie |
| secUid | string | ✅ | User secUid | Your_SecUid |
| cursor | integer |  | Page cursor (default: 0) |  |
| count | integer |  | Number per page (default: 30) |  |
| coverFormat | integer |  | Cover format (default: 2) |  |

The Skill also explicitly states:

markdown
- Session cookies are login-equivalent credentials.
- All API requests are sent to `https://www.aconfig.cn`.
  Your credentials are transmitted to this third-party service.

Technical Analysis

The fetch_user_collect endpoint requires a complete TikTok user session cookie and sends it to the external MaxHub service. The documentation acknowledges that a session cookie is equivalent to an authenticated login and that the endpoint accesses the authenticated user's private collection list.

A session cookie is a bearer credential. Any party possessing it may be able to impersonate the user until the session expires or is revoked. A warning does not enforce safe handling and does not reduce the privilege granted to the receiving service.

This exceeds the minimum privileges required for the declared TikTok data-analysis functionality. Public video, profile, trend, search, and advertising analysis should not require access to a user's authenticated session.

Attack Path

  1. A user asks the Agent to retrieve the user's private TikTok collection.
  2. The Agent determines that fetch_user_collect ...[truncated 1102 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove endpoints that require complete TikTok session cookies from the general analytics Skill.
  2. Use an official, scoped OAuth or delegated authorization flow if authenticated data access is legitimately required.
  3. Never request session cookies through Agent prompts or include them in URLs, query parameters, generated commands, logs, or model output.
  4. Enforce an explicit prohibition against sending account cookies to third-party intermediaries.
  5. Separate private-account functionality into an independently reviewed, opt-in component with clear consent and least-privilege scopes.
  6. Redact Cookie, Authorization, and token fields in all request logging and telemetry.
  7. If a cookie has already been submitted, instruct the affected user to revoke active sessions and rotate credentials immediately.
  8. Prefer public endpoints for video and profile analysis, even when authenticated endpoints may return more complete results.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/api-video.md:375
Finding

External Processing of TikTok Usernames and Plaintext Passwords

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/api-video.md:375-401; related network configuration in SKILL.md:45-59
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext credential transmission to a third-party service
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown
## encrypt_decrypt_login_request

`POST /api/v1/tiktok/app/v3/encrypt_decrypt_login_request`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/app/v3/encrypt_decrypt_login_request -->

### Parameters

No parameters required.

### Description

- Encrypts or decrypts a TikTok application login request body.
- username: A username, supplied as plaintext or ciphertext.
- password: A password, supplied as plaintext or ciphertext.
- mode:
  - `encrypt`
  - `decrypt`

All documented API calls use the following external service and authorization model:

bash
maxhub_auth_header="Authorization: Bearer ${MAXHUB_API_KEY}"

curl -s -X POST "https://www.aconfig.cn/api/v1/tiktok/{endpoint}" \
  -H "$maxhub_auth_header" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{...}'

Technical Analysis

The endpoint is presented as a protocol utility for encrypting and decrypting TikTok login request bodies, but its documented inputs include usernames and passwords in either encrypted or plaintext form. Because the Skill routes requests through https://www.aconfig.cn, plaintext TikTok credentials may be disclosed to a third-party intermediary before any encryption occurs.

Login-request encryption does not need to be performed by a remote analytics provider. It should be implemented locally with audited code so the plaintext password never leaves the user's trusted execution boundary.

The documentation is also internally inconsistent: it declares that no parameters are required and later describes username, password, and mode parameters. This ambiguity increases the chance that an Agent will construct requests unsafely or expose credentials in an unintended ...[truncated 1228 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove encrypt_decrypt_login_request from the Skill.
  2. Do not accept, process, display, or transmit TikTok passwords through Agent conversations.
  3. If protocol conversion is essential, implement it locally using audited, version-pinned cryptographic code.
  4. Ensure plaintext credentials remain exclusively within the user's trusted local process.
  5. Replace password-based workflows with official authorization protocols using narrowly scoped, revocable tokens.
  6. Add validation that rejects fields named password, passwd, sessionid, or equivalent credential values before any external request.
  7. Reconcile the contradictory parameter documentation and define an explicit machine-readable request schema.
  8. Add automatic redaction for request bodies, generated shell commands, errors, and model responses.
  9. Conduct an independent review of the third-party provider's logging, retention, access-control, and incident-response practices before sending any other sensitive data.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
references/api-video.md:348
Finding

Protocol Emulation and Device Identity Generation Exceed the Analytics Scope

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/api-video.md:348-373; related capabilities at references/api-video.md:409-432 and references/param-mappings.md:638-668
Vulnerability Type: Excessive protocol and identity-generation capability
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown
## device_register

`GET /api/v1/tiktok/web/device_register`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/web/device_register -->

### Parameters

No parameters required.

### Response

Standard MaxHub response: `{code, message, message_zh, data, cache_url}`

### Description

- Registers a device for TikTok Web.
- Generates a device ID and guest cookie.
- Returns device registration information, including the device ID
  and guest cookie.

Related documented utilities include:

markdown
## generate_fingerprint

- `browser_type` (string, optional)

## generate_real_msToken

- `random_strData` (boolean, optional)
- `browser_type` (string, optional)

## generate_webid

- `cookie` (string, optional)
- `user_agent` (string, optional)
- `url` (string, optional)
- `referer` (string, optional)
- `user_unique_id` (string, optional)
- `app_id` (integer, optional)

Technical Analysis

The Skill exposes device registration, browser-fingerprint generation, guest-cookie generation, Web ID creation, and real msToken generation. These are protocol-emulation primitives rather than ordinary read-only analytics operations.

Individually, these utilities may have legitimate compatibility uses. In combination, however, they enable the construction of synthetic browser or device identities and authenticated-looking request metadata. This expands the Skill's authority beyond retrieving data and creates a reusable foundation for automated scraping or platform-control evasion.

The broad routing rule in SKILL.md makes these endpoints available to the same Agent that autonomously plans and ex ...[truncated 1441 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove protocol-emulation utilities from the general TikTok analytics Skill.
  2. Place any necessary compatibility tools in a separate, explicitly installed Skill with an independent security review.
  3. Require informed user confirmation before generating a device identity, fingerprint, guest cookie, signature, or token.
  4. Define strict allowed purposes and reject requests involving control evasion, bulk identity generation, or automated account access.
  5. Rate-limit device and token creation and prevent batch generation.
  6. Prevent automatic chaining of fingerprint, registration, cookie, token, and signature endpoints.
  7. Avoid returning reusable cookies or tokens in model output; store them only in short-lived protected process memory when essential.
  8. Prefer official TikTok APIs and authorization mechanisms instead of emulating private application or web protocols.
  9. Add auditable telemetry that records endpoint names and consent decisions without recording generated secrets.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:17
Finding

Unpinned Package Resolution and Execution Through npx

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: README.md:17-21; duplicated in README_CN.md:17-21
Vulnerability Type: Mutable third-party installation dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown
## Install

```bash
npx clawhub install maxhub-tiktok
text

### Technical Analysis

The installation command uses `npx` without pinning the `clawhub` package to a reviewed version or specifying an integrity digest. Depending on the local package-manager state, `npx` may resolve and download mutable package content from a registry and execute its package entry point.

The effective installer code can therefore change after this Skill has been audited. A registry compromise, package-account takeover, dependency confusion condition, or malicious future package release could cause arbitrary code to run during installation.

No evidence in the reviewed project proves that the current `clawhub` package is malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe, mutable execution path recommended by the documentation.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, package registry, distribution path, or a transitive dependency used by the resolved installer.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under the package name resolved by `npx`.
3. A user follows the documented installation command.
4. `npx` downloads the currently resolved package because no reviewed version or integrity value is specified.
5. The package's executable runs with the permissions of the installing user.
6. The malicious installer can access files, environment variables, developer credentials, and network resources available to that user.

### Impact Assessment

Successful supply-chain exploitation could result in arbitrary local code execution with the installing user's privileges. Depending on the environment, this may expose:

- `MAXHUB_API_KEY` and other environment variables.
- Source code, configu
...[truncated 265 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the installer to a specific audited version rather than resolving the latest package.
  2. Publish and verify a cryptographic integrity hash or signed release artifact.
  3. Commit and enforce a lockfile for all installer dependencies.
  4. Document the authoritative registry and package publisher identity.
  5. Use provenance verification, package signatures, and reproducible builds where available.
  6. Run installation in a sandbox or container with minimal filesystem, environment-variable, and network access.
  7. Review lifecycle scripts and transitive dependencies before approving a release.
  8. Update both README files so they provide identical pinned and integrity-verified instructions.
  9. Avoid exposing API keys or other credentials in the environment while executing package installation commands.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (186)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documentation advertises state-changing actions like like, follow, post_comment, reply_comment, collect, and forward without any warning about account impact, consent, rate limits, or misuse risk. In the context of a TikTok automation skill, these operations can directly modify a user's account behavior or content interactions, raising the risk of unauthorized actions, abuse, and policy violations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'agent_skill_prompt_injection_hidden_instructions': Prompt injection or hidden instructions embedded in AI agent skill text [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill contains numerous agent-directing instructions embedded in skill text, including broad routing rules, autonomous execution guidance, and strong safety-framing around sensitive utilities. In context, this is dangerous because the skill mixes hidden/embedded behavioral control with risky capabilities such as cookie-required flows, token/signature generation, guest-cookie fetching, and action-trigger endpoints, increasing the chance of unsafe agent behavior if the skill prompt is trusted too broadly.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md
��", "视频分析", "用户分析", "广告分析", "创作者", "店铺商品", "跨境营销", "多地区", "评论采集", "直播数据", "搜索", "数据分析", "海外社媒", "数据采集", "合规", "只读", "数据分析", "合法API"]
    category: productivity
---

# TikTok 数据助手

**Get started:** Sign up and get your API key at https://www.aconfig.cn

You are a TikTok Data Assistant. Help users query data via the MaxHub API at https://www.aconfig.cn.

**Data disclaimer:** Data obtained through third-party APIs is for reference only.

**API coverage:** 189 active endpoints **first message** and maintain it throughout the conversation.

| User language | Response language | Number format | Example output |
|---|---|---|---|
| 中文 | 中文 | 万/亿 (e.g. 1.2亿) | "共找到 1,234 条结果" |
| English | English | K/M/B (e.g. 120M) | "Found 1,234 results" |

## API Access

Base URL: `https://www.aconfig.cn`

Use the configured `MAXHUB_API_KEY` value as the `Au

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

md
> ⚠️ **Capability Classification / 能力分类**
> - **Read-only data queries** (majority): Video details, user profiles, search, trending, analytics — these only retrieve data.
> - **App interaction triggers** ⚠️: `open_*_app_to_*` — these generate deep links that open the platform app. They do NOT directly send messages or perform actions; they only produce URLs the user can choose to open.
> - **Protocol utilities** ⚠️: `generate_*`, `encrypt_*`, `decrypt_*`, `register_device` — these are API compatibility tools for request construction. They do NOT bypass security controls independently.
> - **Cookie-required endpoints** ⚠️: Some endpoints need a user session cookie for personalized data. See Cookie warnings below.
> - **只读数据查询**（大多数）：视频详情、用户画像、搜索、热榜、分析——仅获取数据。
> - **应用交互触发** ⚠️：`open_*_app_to_*`——生成打开平台应用的深度链接，不会直接发送消息或执行操作，仅生成用户可选择打开的 URL。

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

md
| 禁止行为 | 正确做法 |
|----------|----------|
| ❌ 自行拼接路径（如 `/api/v1/douyin/search/xxx`） | ✅ 使用 Action Table 或 `<!-- Full path: -->` 中的路径 |
| ❌ 猜测参数名（如把 `aweme_id` 写成 `video_id`） | ✅ 使用 Action Table 或 reference 文件中的参数名 |
| ❌ 假设 v1/v2/v3 参数兼容 | ✅ 降级时重新读取对应版本的参数文档 |
| ❌ 调用 `fetch_hot_search_list` 或 `app/v3/fetch_video_comments` | ✅ 使用替代端点（见废弃标注） |

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

md
| 禁止行为 | 正确做法 |
|----------|----------|
| ❌ 自行拼接路径(如 `/api/v1/douyin/search/xxx`) | ✅ 使用 Action Table 或 `<!-- Full path: -->` 中的路径 |
| ❌ 猜测参数名(如把 `aweme_id` 写成 `video_id`) | ✅ 使用 Action Table 或 reference 文件中的参数名 |
| ❌ 假设 v1/v2/v3 参数兼容 | ✅ 降级时重新读取对应版本的参数文档 |
| ❌ 调用 `fetch_hot_search_list` 或 `app/v3/fetch_video_comments` | ✅ 使用替代端点(见废弃标注) |

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The security/compliance section claims the skill performs only read-only queries, but other sections enumerate endpoints for posting comments/replies, opening message flows, generating tokens/signatures, guest-cookie retrieval, and device registration. Such contradictions can cause policy engines, reviewers, or users to under-classify the risk and permit actions they would otherwise block.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 240)May include surrounding context.

md
| "analyze" / "分析一下" | Switch to analyze mode |
| "compare with X" / "和X对比" | Add X as second query |

## Output Guidelines

1. **Language consistency** — ALL output matches user's detected language.
2. **Markdown links** — All URLs in `[text](url)` format.

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
`POST /api/v1/tiktok/creator/get_account_health_status`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/creator/get_account_health_status -->

### Parameters

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This section documents collection and transmission of a user's TikTok cookie string for authentication without warning that cookies are equivalent to account credentials and may enable full session hijacking. Because the endpoint concerns creator account health and violations, misuse of stolen cookies could expose sensitive account state or enable actions under the victim's session depending on backend behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation recommends optional HTTP proxy usage alongside cookie-based authentication without warning that the proxy can observe or tamper with traffic and credentials. In this context, routing session cookies through third-party infrastructure materially increases the chance of credential theft, surveillance, or man-in-the-middle abuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

md
`POST /api/v1/tiktok/creator/get_account_insights_overview`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/creator/get_account_insights_overview -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_ad_interactive_analysis`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_ad_interactive_analysis -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 172)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_ad_keyframe_analysis`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_ad_keyframe_analysis -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 228)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_ad_percentile`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_ad_percentile -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 292)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_creative_patterns`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_creative_patterns -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 362)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_creator_filters`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_creator_filters -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 411)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_product_filters`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_product_filters -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 483)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_product_metrics`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_product_metrics -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-ads-analytics.md (reported line 589)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_top_ads_spotlight`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_top_ads_spotlight -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-search.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/web/fetch_search_photo`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/web/fetch_search_photo -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-search.md (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/web/fetch_trending_searchwords`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/web/fetch_trending_searchwords -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-search.md (reported line 162)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_keyword_filters`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_keyword_filters -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-search.md (reported line 215)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_keyword_insights`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_keyword_insights -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-search.md (reported line 348)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_related_keywords`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_related_keywords -->

### Parameters

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-search.md (reported line 418)May include surrounding context.

md
`GET /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_sound_filters`

<!-- Full path: /api/v1/tiktok/ads/get_sound_filters -->

### Parameters

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.