T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/myself_manager.py:273- Finding
Profile Operations Do Not Enforce User Consent or Activation State
- Content
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Dict[str, Any]: """Securely read myself.md file content""" try: if not self.myself_file.exists(): return { "success": False, "message": "myself.md file does not exist", "file_path": str(self.myself_file), "content": "" } with open(self.myself_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f: content = f.read() self._log_operation("read", f"Read myself.md ({len(content)} characters)") return { "success": True, "message": "myself.md read successfully", "file_path": str(self.myself_file), "content": content, "content_length": len(content) } except Exception as e: return { "success": False, "message": f"Failed to read myself.md: {str(e)}", "file_path": str(self.myself_file), "content": "" } ``` The same absence of authorization checks affects the public create, update, and delete operations in `scripts/myself_manager.py:216-394`, as well as their convenience wrappers in `scripts/myself_manager.py:468-491`. ### Technical Analysis `MyselfManager` exposes methods that read, create, overwrite, and delete the user's personalization profile. These methods do not consult `ConsentManager`, verify the status in `i-skill_state.json`, or require a confirmation capability for destructive operations. The enforcement boundary therefore exists only in the natural-language instructions in `SKILL.md`, not in the code that performs the protected operation. Any local component that can import this module can invoke the profile APIs directly and bypass the documented consent lifecycle. This violates ...[truncated 1243 chars]- Remediation
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