T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
hids_common.py:359- Finding
Untrusted access-log client identity can trigger privileged firewall bans
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Mini-HIDS is a coherent defensive tool, but it can automatically make privileged firewall changes from log data that may be ambiguous or spoofable.
Install only after reviewing the configuration for your server. Pin the source you install, set trusted IPs and web roots narrowly, avoid automatic web-log bans behind proxies unless client identity is trustworthy, and treat the MCP server as a privileged local control plane because it can change firewall state.
hids_common.py:359Untrusted access-log client identity can trigger privileged firewall bans
hids_common.py:403Unbounded web-root and alert-log reads can exhaust process memory
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
After your agent has packaged the project as a skill, adjust config.json for the target server and start the daemon:
sudo python3 mini_hids.py
This helper executes firewall management commands via subprocess and is later used to add DROP rules, delete rules, and invoke fail2ban ban/unban actions. The file contains no confirmation prompt, print/log disclosure, or explanatory comment/docstring warning that it will modify host firewall state, which is a safety-critical operation.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
self.backend = detect_firewall(backend)
def _run(self, command, check=True):
return subprocess.run(
command,
check=check,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
)
def _capture(self, command):
return subprocess.run(
command,
check=False,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
This code returns multiple hard-coded Chinese response messages such as '封禁失败', '已成功封禁', '无效的 IP 地址', and '已成功解封'. The file provides no opt-in, locale selection, or justification that the skill is intentionally region-specific, which is a natural-language locale policy violation under the stated rules.
Several user-visible error strings are hard-coded in Chinese, such as the argument validation messages returned to callers. This imposes a specific language on all users of the skill and does not provide opt-in, fallback, or documentation that the tool is intentionally Chinese-only.
The module description is entirely in Chinese and presents the skill as a general-purpose Mini-HIDS rather than a region-specific tool. User-facing runtime messages throughout the file are also hard-coded in Chinese, with no indication that language selection is optional or configurable, which violates the language/locale policy criteria.
This Python test file contains multiple natural-language strings that enforce Chinese alert labels such as "Web攻击", "SSH暴力破解", and other Chinese log message formats. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in or documented justification is a locale-policy violation, and the file does not indicate that this is a region-specific or opt-in behavior.
The skill returns user-facing status messages in Chinese and also depends on Chinese alert labels/messages when parsing alerts. This imposes a specific language/locale without offering user choice or documenting a justified locale restriction, which matches the language policy concern.
This file is an SVG image, so only SQP-3 applies. The visible title, description, and labels are all in Chinese, and the file does not indicate that this locale is optional or specifically required for a region-scoped skill, which can conflict with language/locale choice policies.
No suspicious patterns detected.