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Security audit

Skill Analytics

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is purpose-aligned analytics, but it broadly records sensitive usage details across sessions and includes unsafe logging and optional persistence patterns that need review.

Install only if you intentionally want cross-session local analytics for skill usage. Treat the log as sensitive: avoid raw trigger phrases, redact group or personal details, use a safe JSON-writing helper instead of echo substitution, set restrictive file permissions, define retention, and skip the optional cron entry unless the referenced script is audited and easy to remove.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T06 · System Persistence

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:117
Finding

Optional Cron Configuration Creates Persistent Scheduled Execution

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:37
Finding

Untrusted Analytics Metadata Is Interpolated into a Shell Command

Content
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> /opt/ocana/openclaw/workspace/data/skill-analytics.jsonl ``` Replace `SKILL_NAME`, `TRIGGER`, `CONTEXT` with real values. ``` ### Technical Analysis The documentation instructs agents to replace placeholders inside a shell command with real metadata. The `trigger` value is derived from the phrase that caused Skill selection and can therefore contain user-controlled text. No shell escaping or JSON serialization is applied before substitution. If an agent constructs the command by directly replacing `TRIGGER`, `CONTEXT`, or `SKILL_NAME` with raw values and then executes the resulting command, shell metacharacters can alter command parsing. Command substitutions such as `$(...)` or backticks can execute while inside double quotes. Embedded double quotes, semicolons, redirection operators, or newlines can also terminate the intended string and introduce additional commands. Even where shell execution is not achieved, quotes, backslashes, control characters, and newlines can produce malformed JSON or inject additional JSONL records, compromising report integrity. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker submits a trigger phrase containing shell syntax, such as a command substitution or a quote-breaking payload. 2. The agent selects a Skill based on that phrase. 3. Following the analytics instructions, the agent replaces `TRIGGER` with the raw phrase in the documented shell command. 4. The agent executes the dynamically constructed command. 5. The shell interprets the injected ...[truncated 914 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:24
Finding

Cross-Session Behavioral Metadata Is Stored in Plaintext Without Defined Protections

Content
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> /opt/ocana/openclaw/workspace/data/skill-analytics.jsonl ``` ``` The Skill description additionally states that it tracks usage “across all agent sessions” and logs every Skill invocation. ### Technical Analysis The analytics record contains the trigger phrase that caused Skill selection and a context identifying a direct message, group, or cron execution. Trigger phrases can disclose user intentions or portions of private conversations, while group names can disclose organizational or social context. The collected data is stored across sessions in a plaintext JSONL file. The documentation does not establish: - User consent or an opt-out mechanism. - Data minimization or trigger redaction. - Restrictive file and directory permissions. - A fixed retention period. - Automatic rotation or deletion. - Access-control expectations for report generation. - Protection against following a pre-existing symbolic link. The claim that the log is “local only” does not eliminate confidentiality risk. Any local principal or compromised process with permission to read the file can inspect the accumulated behavioral history. The actual exposure depends on the deployment account's umask, directory ownership, and filesystem permissions, none of which are enforced here. ### Attack Path 1. Users invoke Skills through direct messages or named group contexts. 2. The analytics instructions append trigger phrases and context identifiers to the persistent JSONL file. 3. Records accumulate across sessions. 4. A local user, plugin, or compromise ...[truncated 866 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill is designed to record every invocation along with trigger phrases and context across all sessions, but it provides no user-facing notice, consent flow, or minimization guidance. Even though the data stays local, these fields can contain sensitive behavioral and conversational metadata, creating a privacy risk if the file or generated reports are accessed by others.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The log format stores user-provided trigger phrases in plaintext and later uses them in reports, which can directly expose private requests, names, internal topics, or other sensitive content. Because triggers are free-form, the skill may capture far more sensitive material than intended, and anyone with access to the log or report can read it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The instructions tell agents to log real trigger and context values before doing any work, making retention of potentially sensitive user content and conversation metadata a default behavior. This increases risk because collection happens automatically and broadly, including in direct messages or named groups where metadata itself may be sensitive.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The report output intentionally displays recent trigger phrases, which can reveal private user requests to anyone who views the analytics summary. This amplifies the privacy risk beyond storage alone by republishing sensitive content in a human-readable format that may be shared more widely than the raw log.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The reset/archive procedure moves the active log and starts a fresh file without warning operators that they are altering operational history and potentially disrupting audit continuity. This is primarily an integrity and operational transparency issue rather than a direct exploit path, but it can still hinder investigations or usage reviews.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.