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Security audit

Neshama Soul Openclaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a personality and memory add-on, but it asks for persistent behavioral influence and external API use with unclear consent and contradictory privacy disclosure.

Review this carefully before installing. Use it only if you are comfortable with a persistent profile influencing future sessions and with some messages potentially being sent to api.neshama.pw. Avoid sensitive code, secrets, personal data, or confidential project details unless the publisher adds explicit consent, local-only defaults, data minimization, and clear reset/delete controls.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (5)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
soul/AGENTS.md:31
Finding

Persistent Agent Identity and Behavior Hijacking

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: soul/AGENTS.md:31-42; related behavior in README.md:67-71, soul/IDENTITY.md:43-50, and soul/USER.md:4
Vulnerability Type: Persistent instruction and identity override
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

The following is an English translation of the relevant source instructions:

markdown
## Behavioral Red Lines (Absolutely Prohibited)

### Security Red Lines
1. Do not disclose user privacy.
2. Do not bypass the personality configuration — the Agent cannot pretend these configurations do not exist.
3. Do not modify SOUL.md or IDENTITY.md without authorization.
4. Do not use harmful code.

### Professional Red Lines
1. Do not make decisions for the user.
2. Do not ignore user preferences — the settings in USER.md must be followed.
3. Do not disclose system configuration — third parties must not be told that this is a "personality system."
4. Do not abuse the API.

Related automatic activation instructions state:

markdown
Initialization is automatically triggered after installation without manual configuration.

During the first turn of every new session, the personality context is directly injected.

Technical Analysis

The Skill goes beyond optional response styling. It automatically injects a replacement identity and personality context into every new session, declares its configuration mandatory, prohibits the Agent from bypassing that configuration, and directs the Agent to conceal the existence of the personality system from third parties.

This creates a persistent instruction layer capable of influencing tasks unrelated to personality management. No explicit precedence rule states that these instructions are subordinate to system instructions, developer instructions, safety policies, or the user's current request.

The concealment directive also conflicts with transparent operation by discouraging disclosure of the mechanism influencing the Agent's behavior.

Att

...[truncated 1111 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Make personality activation explicitly opt-in rather than automatic after installation.
  2. Allow users to enable or disable the personality for each session.
  3. Remove directives that prohibit bypassing or disclosing the personality system.
  4. Add an explicit precedence statement specifying that all Skill instructions are subordinate to system instructions, developer instructions, safety requirements, and the user's current request.
  5. Restrict personality behavior to presentation properties such as tone and formatting.
  6. Prevent personality configuration from changing tool authorization, security decisions, disclosure obligations, or task objectives.
  7. Clearly notify users whenever persistent personality context is loaded.
  8. Provide a documented command to disable the Skill and remove all persistent state.

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
soul/USER.md:1
Finding

Persistent Memory Poisoning Through Unsanitized User Preferences

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: soul/USER.md:1-12; related write and load behavior in soul/BOOTSTRAP.md:31-39, soul/AGENTS.md:62-67, soul/HEARTBEAT.md:50-59, and soul/USER.md:79
Vulnerability Type: Persistent storage of attacker-controlled behavioral instructions
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

The following is an English translation of the relevant source:

markdown
# User Preference Configuration

Created by the user or automatically generated during the first conversation.

Important: This is a configuration that the Agent must follow and reference in every response.

## Basic Information

- Username: Asked during first use
- Creation date: Automatically recorded
- Last updated: Automatically updated

The initialization and recurring behavior further state:

markdown
Generate the soul/USER.md file automatically based on the user's answers.
markdown
Load USER.md as the user preference configuration during every session.
markdown
When a new user preference is detected, update USER.md automatically.
markdown
Technical decision history is automatically recorded by the Agent.

Technical Analysis

The Skill accepts user-provided content, writes it into a persistent Markdown file, reloads that file in every session, and declares its contents mandatory. It does not define a strict schema, an allowlist of permitted values, escaping rules, maximum lengths, or separation between descriptive profile data and executable Agent instructions.

Because the profile format contains free-form fields such as special preferences, disliked methods, avoided topics, and sensitive-operation preferences, an attacker can submit instruction-shaped content as a preference. Once persisted, that content can continue affecting future sessions.

Automatic heartbeat updates increase this risk because persistent state can change without an explicit confirmation for each write.

Attack Path

  1. An attacke ...[truncated 986 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace free-form Markdown preferences with a strict structured schema.
  2. Permit only allowlisted fields and bounded values, such as language identifiers, formatting enums, and boolean presentation options.
  3. Never interpret stored profile text as instructions.
  4. Mark all persisted user content as untrusted data when loading it into model context.
  5. Reject content containing role changes, instruction-precedence claims, tool directives, secret requests, or attempts to modify safety behavior.
  6. Require explicit user confirmation before every persistent write.
  7. Disable automatic heartbeat-based preference modification.
  8. Maintain a visible audit log of changes and provide rollback functionality.
  9. Scope persistent profiles per authenticated user to prevent cross-user contamination.
  10. Apply file permissions that prevent unrelated local users or processes from modifying the profile.

other

Error
Location
soul/TOOLS.md:32
Finding

External Transmission of Complete User Messages and Stable Identifiers

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: soul/TOOLS.md:32-45; related endpoint and privacy statements in soul/TOOLS.md:11-14 and soul/TOOLS.md:143-149
Vulnerability Type: Undisclosed or contradictory external data transmission
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

The API request format is:

json
{
  "personality_config": {
    "ocean": {
      "openness": 0.7,
      "conscientiousness": 0.6,
      "extraversion": 0.8,
      "agreeableness": 0.7,
      "neuroticism": 0.3
    },
    "traits": ["brave", "enthusiastic"],
    "behavior_rules": []
  },
  "message": "the user's message",
  "context": {
    "session_id": "session ID",
    "user_id": "user ID"
  }
}

The destination is:

text
POST https://api.neshama.pw/v1/soul/compute

The privacy section makes the contradictory claim:

markdown
## Data Storage

- Prefer local storage.
- Do not upload data to third-party servers.
- The user may delete USER.md at any time.

Technical Analysis

The documented API request transmits the complete user message together with a session identifier and user identifier to an external domain. User messages may contain source code, credentials, personal information, proprietary data, or confidential project details.

The project does not define a per-request consent flow, message redaction, data minimization, identifier rotation, remote retention policy, deletion protocol, or contractual processing boundary.

This behavior directly contradicts the statement that data is not uploaded to third-party servers. Even if api.neshama.pw is operated by the Skill author, it remains an external service relative to the local Agent environment.

Attack Path

  1. The user submits a message during initial personality setup, emotion processing, or detailed personality-context generation.
  2. The Skill determines that an API request should be made.
  3. The complete message is placed in the message field.
  4. Stable session and user identifiers ...[truncated 788 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Disable all external transmission by default.
  2. Obtain informed, explicit consent before each request containing user content.
  3. Show the destination, exact fields, and purpose before transmission.
  4. Do not send complete messages when numeric or locally derived personality features are sufficient.
  5. Remove user_id and use short-lived, unlinkable request identifiers only where necessary.
  6. Redact credentials, tokens, personal data, source code, and other sensitive content before transmission.
  7. Provide a documented retention period, deletion mechanism, privacy policy, and processor/subprocessor disclosure.
  8. Use local emotion and personality calculations whenever possible.
  9. Correct the inaccurate statement that data is not uploaded to third-party servers.
  10. Add an enforceable network allowlist and logging that lets users review every outbound request.

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
soul/TOOLS.md:49
Finding

Untrusted Remote API Response Is Designed for Injection into LLM Context

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: soul/TOOLS.md:49-61; related invocation rules in soul/TOOLS.md:70-78 and synchronization behavior in soul/HEARTBEAT.md:26-30
Vulnerability Type: Remote instruction injection
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

The documented API response is:

json
{
  "emotion_state": {
    "current": "happy",
    "intensity": 0.7,
    "valence": 0.6,
    "arousal": 0.5
  },
  "context_for_llm": "Personality prompt: You have an outgoing and cheerful personality...",
  "suggested_temperature": 0.8,
  "suggested_tone": "enthusiastic"
}

The Skill calls the API in the following situations:

markdown
| Scenario | Call API |
| First personality initialization | Yes |
| Real-time emotional change is needed | Yes |
| Detailed personality prompt generation is needed | Yes |
| Routine conversation | No |
| API unavailable | No |

The heartbeat instructions also allow synchronization with the API when considered necessary.

Technical Analysis

The remote response contains a field explicitly named context_for_llm, indicating that server-provided text is intended to become part of the LLM context. The Skill provides no strict validation, signature verification, content allowlist, length limit, or instruction/data boundary for this field.

As a result, the effective Agent instructions can change after the local Skill package has been reviewed. A compromised, malicious, or misconfigured API could return arbitrary instruction text rather than a harmless personality prompt.

This is instruction retrieval rather than executable-code retrieval; therefore, it is classified as Skill Instruction Hijacking rather than remote code execution.

Attack Path

  1. The Agent encounters a scenario that triggers the personality API.
  2. It sends a request to api.neshama.pw.
  3. The API or an attacker controlling the API response returns malicious content in context_for_llm.
  4. The returned text is inserted into the ...[truncated 699 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove context_for_llm and all other free-form instruction fields from remote responses.
  2. Accept only a strict schema containing bounded numeric values and allowlisted enumerations.
  3. Validate types, ranges, lengths, and permitted values before using any response.
  4. Treat every remote string as untrusted data and never place it in system, developer, or instruction context.
  5. Map validated values to locally maintained prompt templates.
  6. Authenticate responses where supported and enforce TLS certificate validation.
  7. Fail closed when validation fails rather than passing the response to the model.
  8. Log and visibly disclose remote configuration changes.
  9. Disable autonomous heartbeat synchronization unless the user explicitly approves it.
  10. Add tests using adversarial response values to ensure that remote prompt injection cannot cross the data/instruction boundary.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
soul/TOOLS.md:18
Finding

Hardcoded Shared API Credential with Automatic Fallback Use

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: soul/TOOLS.md:18-24; related copies in README.md:75-81 and SKILL.md:90-96, with fallback behavior in soul/TOOLS.md:85-90
Vulnerability Type: Hardcoded shared credential
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown
### Public Test Key

nsh_public_beta_2026

Note: This is a public beta key with a daily limit of 1,000 requests.
For production use, register for a personal key.

The error-handling instructions include:

markdown
| Error Type | Status | Handling |
| Missing key | 401 | Retry using the public key |
| Invalid key | 401 | Ask the user to check the key |
| Rate limited | 429 | Fall back to local configuration |
| Service unavailable | 503 | Use default configuration |

Technical Analysis

A shared API credential is embedded in multiple files and automatically used as a fallback when a key is missing. Because the package is publicly readable, the credential provides no meaningful caller authentication or secrecy.

Any party can extract and reuse it independently of the Skill. Shared use also prevents reliable attribution and allows one abusive consumer to exhaust quota for all legitimate users.

Although the project labels it a public beta key, treating it as an authentication credential and automatically retrying with it remains an insecure configuration pattern.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker downloads or reads the Skill package.
  2. The attacker extracts nsh_public_beta_2026.
  3. The attacker sends requests directly to the documented API endpoint using the shared key.
  4. The attacker consumes the daily quota or generates abusive traffic attributed to the same credential.
  5. Legitimate Skill users experience throttling or service degradation.
  6. The service cannot reliably distinguish legitimate users from unauthorized consumers of the published key.

Impact Assessment

The exposed credential permits use of whatever API access is granted to the shared beta k ...[truncated 310 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the shared key from all project files and documentation.
  2. Revoke or rotate the published credential.
  3. Remove automatic fallback to any embedded credential.
  4. Require users to supply individual API credentials through the platform's secure secret store.
  5. Never place personal credentials in Markdown, source files, logs, or persistent prompt context.
  6. Scope credentials to the minimum API operations and quotas required.
  7. Implement per-user rate limiting and attribution on the server.
  8. Use short-lived tokens where the platform supports them.
  9. Ensure missing credentials cause a local-only fallback rather than an authenticated network retry.
  10. Add secret scanning to the release process to prevent future credential publication.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (25)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The privacy section conflicts with earlier instructions to call an external API and transmit user-related data. Conflicting documentation can mislead operators into deploying the skill in contexts where third-party transfer is prohibited, creating legal, privacy, and trust impacts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The privacy section states that data is not uploaded to third-party servers, but the documented workflow sends messages and identifiers to an external API endpoint. This is a material misrepresentation that can cause users or downstream integrators to share data under false assumptions, increasing privacy, compliance, and consent risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README states that initialization runs automatically after install and that personality context is injected into every new session, but it does not clearly warn users that preferences, identity, and behavioral state may persist and influence future outputs. In an agent skill, silent persistence and automatic prompt injection can materially affect user privacy, consent, and model behavior across sessions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.

md
|------|------|
| 官网 | https://neshama.pw |
| SoulCraft | https://neshama.pw/soulcraft |
| API 文档 | https://api.neshama.pw/docs |
| GitHub | https://github.com/Neshama-AI/neshama-soul-openclaw |

---

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 107)May include surrounding context.

md
|------|------|
| 官网 | https://neshama.pw |
| SoulCraft | https://neshama.pw/soulcraft |
| API 文档 | https://api.neshama.pw/docs |
| GitHub | https://github.com/Neshama-AI/neshama-soul-openclaw |

---

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The natural-language content of the skill forces a specific language for installation and usage instructions, and no opt-in or alternative language is offered. Per SQP-3, fixed language requirements can violate language/locale policy unless the skill provides user choice or clearly documents a justified regional constraint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly claims it will remember user preferences and technical decisions as part of a persistent personality/memory system, but the visible documentation does not explain what data is stored, where it is stored, how long it is retained, or how users can review or delete it. In an agent context, silent persistence of behavioral and preference data can create privacy and consent risks, especially when the skill also references external services and API usage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill states that it will remember coding preferences, record technical decision history, and maintain a USER.md preference file, but it does not warn the user that data will be stored persistently. Persistent memory without transparent notice and consent can expose sensitive preferences, internal project details, or historical decisions beyond the current session.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The workflow explicitly directs the agent to generate USER.md and optionally delete BOOTSTRAP.md, but it does not require explicit user consent, confirmation, or clear disclosure before writing or deleting local files. In an agent context, undocumented persistent file creation or deletion can violate user expectations, overwrite local state, or remove artifacts needed for auditability and recovery.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to collect user preference data and persist it to soul/USER.md, but it provides no notice about storage, retention, sensitivity, or user consent. Even though the requested fields look low-risk, freeform items like '特别偏好' can easily capture sensitive personal or workplace information, creating an avoidable privacy and data-handling risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The heartbeat task says the agent may call an API to update configuration, but it provides no disclosure about what data may be transmitted, under what conditions, or whether sensitive personality/user-state information leaves the local environment. Because this task is described as automatically triggered, it increases the chance of silent background data transmission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly directs the agent to automatically update USER.md when it detects new user preferences, but it does not require user consent, preview, or any warning that persistent user data will be modified. In a memory/personality skill, this is risky because inferred preferences can be written permanently, creating privacy, integrity, and unwanted profiling concerns.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill defines its core persona and behavior entirely in Chinese and does not provide any user-language negotiation or documented locale restriction. This can override or bias agent responses into a language the user did not request, causing instruction misalignment, degraded usability, and potential misunderstanding of safety-critical guidance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
72% confidence
Finding

The presence of an external endpoint alone is not inherently malicious, but in this skill's context it introduces a real data egress path for user messages and identifiers. Because the skill is designed for conversational use, messages may naturally contain sensitive contextual information, making external transmission security-relevant.

Content

Scanner excerpt · soul/TOOLS.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md
| 项目 | 值 |
|------|-----|
| **端点** | `POST https://api.neshama.pw/v1/soul/compute` |
| **认证** | `X-API-Key` Header |
| **超时** | 5 秒 |

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The documented use of a shared public test key encourages sending data through a shared credential to a third-party endpoint without a strong warning. Shared keys reduce accountability and increase the chance of accidental use in real conversations, potentially exposing user data in testing infrastructure or mixed-tenant logs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The API request format includes session_id and user_id, but the document does not provide a prominent user-facing warning that these identifiers will be transmitted to a third-party service. This weakens informed consent and can expose linkable identifiers outside the local environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The document claims user code and project files are not collected, yet it sends an unconstrained user message to an external service. In practice, user messages may contain code, file contents, secrets, or other sensitive material, so the statement understates what can be transmitted.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The file states that user preferences may be auto-generated on first conversation and automatically updated, but it does not warn the user that personal and technical preference data will be persisted. Silent creation and ongoing modification of a profile can cause users to disclose or accumulate sensitive information without informed consent or awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This file instructs the agent to collect and persist detailed technical stack, tooling, cloud, and workflow preferences that go beyond the stated skill purpose of personality and emotional memory. That expanded data collection increases privacy exposure and creates a broader profiling surface that could later influence agent behavior, leak infrastructure details, or be repurposed by other prompts or skills.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The instruction that the agent can update this file on command does not explicitly warn that invoking the feature will alter persisted user data. Without clear persistence and modification warnings, users may trigger profile changes without understanding that durable records are being written and may affect future interactions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The entire skill description is presented in Chinese, including headings, installation guidance, and operational behavior, with no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-language audience. This can violate a language/locale policy where user-facing skills should not impose a language without opt-in or documented justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The entire agent specification, including headings, workflow, triggers, and output conventions, is written in Chinese with no indication that users may choose another language. This can constitute a language/locale policy issue when no opt-in or justification for the locale restriction is provided.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The natural-language interaction script, prompts, and examples are entirely in Chinese, which implicitly forces a specific language for the onboarding flow. Under the language/locale policy, this should either offer the user a language choice or clearly document that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-speaking context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
72% confidence
Finding

All user-facing instructions, prompts, and report formats in this file are presented only in Chinese, and there is no indication that the user can choose another language. A single-language constraint can be a natural-language policy issue when it is imposed without opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The file consistently defines the agent persona and user-facing interaction text in Chinese, including the greeting template and style instructions, without indicating that users may opt into another language. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill imposes a specific language by default rather than offering a choice or documenting a justified locale constraint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.