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Security audit

Shared Memory Stack

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly transparent documentation for shared agent memory, but it also documents persistent cross-agent storage and public GitHub publishing with specific account credentials without enough scoping or user-confirmation guidance.

Review this skill before installing if your sessions may contain private, regulated, or secret information. Use it only with content you intend to persist in a shared vault and semantic index, and do not let an agent run the GitHub publishing commands or use the named SSH/gh credentials without explicit review of exactly what will be pushed publicly.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs agents to persist valuable ideas, observations, and problems into shared memory and auto-index them, but does not prominently warn that this creates durable storage and semantic retrieval of agent-generated content. Sensitive data, credentials, internal discussions, or regulated information could be captured and become discoverable later across tools and sessions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill states that OpenClaw writes to shared vault/files and Claude Code reads them in later sessions, but it does not clearly warn that anything written there becomes visible across agents and persists beyond the immediate interaction. This can cause cross-agent disclosure of confidential prompts, outputs, or user data through a shared filesystem channel.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose is documenting a shared-memory stack, but it also includes instructions to initialize git repositories and publish skills to GitHub. That expands the skill’s operational scope into external networked actions and code publication, which can lead an agent or user to exfiltrate local content or publish unintended material under an authenticated account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 213)May include surrounding context.

Both agents publish to GitHub under nerua1. SSH key and gh are configured.

bash
# Claude Code skills
cd ~/.claude/skills/vault/SKILL_NAME
git init && git add . && git commit -m "feat: SKILL_NAME v1.0.0"
gh repo create SKILL_NAME --public --source . --remote origin --push

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation reveals specific credential and account configuration details, including the SSH key path, authenticated GitHub identity, and git config values. Even without exposing private key material, this materially lowers the barrier for misuse by telling an agent exactly which credentials exist and how to invoke them for outbound actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.