T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/run.py:194- Finding
Sensitive memory files are uploaded without the documented encryption
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a cloud memory-backup tool, but it makes strong security and retention claims that the implementation does not uphold.
Review this skill carefully before installing. It is intended to back up memory to your own cloud bucket, but the implementation does not provide the advertised end-to-end encryption and can overwrite local files during restore based on cloud manifest data. Do not use it for sensitive memory unless encryption, path validation, restore confirmation, and retention behavior are fixed and verified.
scripts/run.py:194Sensitive memory files are uploaded without the documented encryption
scripts/run.py:116Cloud-controlled manifest paths allow arbitrary file overwrite during restore
scripts/run.py:164Unescaped cloud metadata causes stored script injection in the dashboard
This is a dangerous trust mismatch: the skill promises encrypted cloud backups, automated sync, retention, and a dashboard, but the analyzed behavior reportedly does not actually enforce encryption, does not truly automate scheduling, and incompletely prunes retained data. Users may rely on these claims and upload highly sensitive memory data under false assumptions, leading to plaintext exposure, excess retention, and unsafe recovery expectations.
The skill description promises encrypted cloud backup, but the implementation uploads manifests and file contents to S3 without any application-layer encryption step. If the bucket, endpoint, IAM policy, provider-side encryption settings, or transport assumptions are misconfigured or compromised, sensitive memory contents and metadata can be exposed, making this a material confidentiality issue as well as a deceptive security claim.
The skill performs or implies sensitive capabilities including reading local memory files, writing restored data, and sending data to remote cloud storage, but it does not declare an explicit overall tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. In a backup skill handling conversation history and memory state, missing scope declarations weakens reviewability and consent, making unintended data access or exfiltration materially more dangerous.
Restore writes into local memory state but the documentation does not clearly warn that existing files may be overwritten or rolled back. In this context, memory files are operational state for the agent, so an uninformed restore could destroy newer context, corrupt workflows, or reintroduce stale state.
The skill is designed to transmit the entire memory directory, which may contain sensitive conversation history, notes, and agent state, yet it does not present a strong user-facing privacy warning at the point of configuration or use. Given the highly sensitive nature of memory data and the cloud upload context, lack of explicit disclosure increases the risk of accidental exfiltration and unsafe deployment.
Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.
prefix = config.get("path_prefix", "")
key = f"{prefix}{MANIFEST_PREFIX}/{timestamp}.json"
body = json.dumps(manifest, indent=2)
s3.put_object(Bucket=bucket, Key=key, Body=body.encode("utf-8"), ContentType="application/json")
log_event("manifest_uploaded", {"bucket": bucket, "key": key, "files": len(manifest.get("files", {}))})
def list_manifests(config: dict) -> List[dict]:
The description says the skill includes a web dashboard to browse backups, which implies an accessible web interface. This code only generates a local HTML file in the memory directory, and its JavaScript calls a /restore endpoint that is not implemented anywhere in this file, so the claimed dashboard capability is not actually delivered by the code shown.
Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.
if e.response["Error"]["Code"] != "404":
raise
# Upload
s3.upload_file(
Filename=str(MEMORY_DIR / rel_path),
Bucket=bucket,
Key=s3_key,
The manifest advertises versioned retention for 30 days, but the pruning logic only deletes entries under the manifests prefix. Backup file objects under the files/ prefix are never removed or version-pruned here, so historical backup data can persist indefinitely beyond the declared retention window.
The restore path can overwrite all local memory files once invoked, with no CLI confirmation, dry-run, backup, or integrity verification beyond trusting the selected manifest. In a skill handling persistent memory state, accidental or coerced invocation can cause destructive loss of local data and replacement with potentially stale or attacker-controlled remote content.