T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:77- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Executables Receive Sensitive Capabilities
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 77-85
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies executed with access to credentials and host-mounted files
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
json { "mcp": { "servers": { "filesystem-secure": { "command": "docker", "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "-v", "/path/to/allowed:/data", "openclaw/mcp-filesystem-secure"] }, "github": { "transport": "stdio", "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-github"], "env": {"GITHUB_TOKEN": "..."} } } } }Technical Analysis
The proposed configuration executes two third-party artifacts without immutable version constraints:
openclaw/mcp-filesystem-secureis referenced without a version tag or image digest. The container receives a read/write host bind mount at/data.npx -y mcp-githubautomatically downloads and executes the package selected by the npm registry without an exact version, lockfile, or integrity verification. The resulting process receivesGITHUB_TOKEN.
Mutable dependency references allow the effective executable content to change after the Skill has been reviewed. A compromised registry account, malicious package release, replaced image tag, or unexpected upstream update could therefore introduce attacker-controlled code. The project contains no implementation, lockfile, digest, signature policy, source reference, or verification procedure that establishes the integrity of these artifacts.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm package, container repository, publisher account, or mutable image tag, or causes a malicious release to become the version resolved by the configuration.
- A user or agent applies the generated MCP configuration.
- Docker pulls the mutable
openclaw/mcp-filesystem-secureimage, ornpx -ydownloads and automatically executes t ...[truncated 1070 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the npm package to a reviewed exact version rather than resolving the latest release, and use a lockfile with integrity hashes.
- Avoid unattended
npx -yexecution. Install dependencies through a controlled build process and require explicit approval for version changes. - Pin the Docker image by immutable digest, for example
image@sha256:..., after reviewing and verifying the corresponding source and build provenance. - Verify dependency publishers, official source repositories, signatures, checksums, and software bill of materials before execution.
- Run dependencies with least privilege. Use a read-only bind mount where writes are unnecessary, narrow the mounted path, run as a non-root user, drop Linux capabilities, enable a read-only container filesystem, and apply network restrictions.
- Use a fine-grained, short-lived GitHub credential with only the minimum required repository and API permissions. Do not expose broader personal access tokens to the MCP process.
- Store credentials through a dedicated secret manager rather than embedding them in reusable configuration, and rotate any credential suspected of exposure.
- Add an update-review process so dependency version or digest changes trigger source review, security scanning, and integrity verification before deployment.
